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References in this outline to "sections" and "regulations"
are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended,
and Treasury regulations promulgated thereunder, unless otherwise
indicated. References to the "IRS" are to the Internal Revenue
Service.
ESTATE PLANNING DEVELOPMENTS AND TECHNIQUES
I. SELECTED CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST TO ESTATE
PLANNERS
A. Marital Deduction.
1. Shelfer v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. No. 2 (1994).
Because stub income was payable to remainderman
instead of spouse, trust was not includible in the
surviving spouse's estate even though QTIP
deduction was claimed in first decedent's estate.
2. Kurz v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2978 (1994).
Five and five power was a general power of
appointment over the bypass trust even though not
exercisable unless the marital trust was
exhausted.
3. Technical Advice Memorandum 9403005. Where the
decedent bequeathed common stock in a closely held
business to the credit shelter trust and the
preferred stock outright to the surviving spouse,
the stock should be treated as a single
controlling block for gross estate purposes.
However, for marital deduction purposes, the IRS
ruled that the shares passing to the surviving
spouse should be treated as a separate minority
interest, citing Ahmanson Foundation v. United
States, 764 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), and
Chenoweth v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1577 (1987).
4. Private Letter Ruling 9409018. In reversing its
earlier ruling in Private Letter Ruling 9113009,
the IRS holds that loan guarantees will not defeat
the allowance of the estate tax marital deduction.
However, the new ruling is silent on the gift
issues.
5. Private Letter Ruling 9418013. Applicable federal
rate ("AFR") loans to sons from QTIP marital trust
will not be deemed a distribution of all or part
of the surviving spouse's qualifying income
interest.
6. Private Letter Ruling 9420034. Where spouse will
be entitled for life to all income generated by
IRA principal whether held in the IRA or
distributed to the QTIP marital trust, the spouse
will have a qualifying income interest for life in
the IRA which will qualify for QTIP treatment.
7. Private Letter Ruling 9437032. QTIP gift tax
marital deduction treatment will be allowed for
trust created by donor spouse for donee spouse for
life where trust will continue for donor spouse's
benefit following the death of the donee spouse.
B. Valuation.
1. Evanson v. United States, 30 F.3d 960 (8th Cir.
1994). Statute of limitations barring assessment
of gift taxes does not preclude the IRS from
revaluing the adjusted taxable gifts for estate
tax purposes. This is consistent with Levin v.
Commissioner, 986 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 66 (1994).
2. Gillespie v. United States, 23 F.3d 36 (2d Cir.
1994). Underwriting fees are not to be taken into
account as part of a blockage discount in
determining the value of stock in the decedent's
estate.
3. Proctor v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2943
(1994). Estate tax charitable deduction for ranch
was less than gross estate value because option to
lease surface rights for grazing was granted to a
third party under the decedent's will.
4. Section 7520 Final Regulations, T.D. 8540, 1994-32
I.R.B. 24. These final regulations set forth
rules for valuing annuities, term interests, life
estates, and remainders.
5. Section 7520 Proposed Regulations, PS-26-93, 1994-
28 I.R.B. 130. These proposed regulations specify
the circumstances (for example, terminal illness
with less than 50% chance of survival for more
than one year) that preclude the use of the
standard valuation tables.
6. Technical Advice Memorandum 9403002. Where the
decedent owned one block of stock in a closely
held business and had the power to alter the
beneficial enjoyment over a second block held in
trust, both blocks must be aggregated according to
the IRS in determining the fair market value of
the stock in the decedent's gross estate.
7. Technical Advice Memorandum 9403005. Where the
decedent owned a controlling interest block of
stock, the control premium that is attributed to
the decedent's holdings is applicable in
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determining the value of the decedent's entire
holding for purposes of inclusion in the gross
estate without reduction by reason of the fact
that only a minority interest will pass to the
surviving spouse; however, a minority discount is
appropriate in valuing the portion of the
decedent's stock holdings that passes to the
surviving spouse for marital deduction purposes.
8. Technical Advise Memorandum 9432001. Stock held
by parent at death was valued for estate tax
purposes without reference to a block of stock in
same corporation owned by son to whom the stock
was bequeathed. Ruling cites Rev. Rul. 93-12,
1993-1 C.B. 202.
9. Technical Advice Memorandum 9436005. The fact
that each of three 30% blocks of stock transferred
has "swing vote" attributes is a factor to be
taken into account in determining the fair market
value of the stock.
C. Gifts,
1. Metzger v. Commissioner, F.3d , 1994 WL
469868 (4th Cir. 1994). Noncharitable gifts in
the form of checks are complete for federal gift
tax purposes at the time of unconditional delivery
and deposit of the checks even though the checks
were actually honored by the drawee bank the next
year.
2. Ridenour v. Commissioner, F.3d 1994 WL
511747 (4th Cir. 1994). Gifts made under a
general power of attorney were not revocable as a
matter of state law, and gifts were not part of
the decedent/donor's gross estate. Virginia Code
section 11-9.5 was found to have retroactive
effect and not in conflict with Casey v.
Commissioner, 948 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1991).
3. Notice 94-78, 1994-32 I.R.B. 15. Aggressive uses
of charitable remainder trusts (for example, a
two-year trust with an 80% unitrust amount where
the sale of an appreciated asset takes place in
the second year) will not be respected where the
results are inconsistent with the purposes of the
charitable remainder trust provisions. The IRS
reserves the right to not respect the form of the
transaction, to tax the gain to the donor, to
question the tax-exempt status of the trust, and
to impose sanctions (because the postponement of
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the sale may constitute a use of trust assets for
the benefit of the donor).
4. Private Letter Ruling 9436042. The value of
excess contributions of "qualified appreciated
stock" carried over to years after 1994 will
continue to be based on the fair market value at
the time of contribution. All other private
letter rulings that have considered this issue
have reached the same result.
5. Private Letter Ruling 9415007. Where husband and
wife created a family limited partnership with
husband as general partner, gifts of limited
partnership interests will constitute present
interest annual exclusion gifts because each donee
will receive the immediate use, possession, and
enjoyment by virtue of the donee's ability to sell
his or her interest in the partnership to a third
party, subject to the right of first refusal
contained in the partnership agreement in favor of
the other partner.
D. Miscellaneous.
1. O'Neal v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 28 (1994). For
transferee liability purposes relating to gift
taxes payable on gifts, the IRS has an extra year
beyond the three-year statute of limitations to
make adjustments and look to the donees.
2. Arcadia Plumbing Trust v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M.
(CCH) 699 (1994). Trust found to have associates
and business objective plus a majority of the
other four corporate characteristics, therefore
classified as an association taxable as a
corporation.
3. Private Letter Ruling 9413045. Where second-to-
die life insurance policies on the lives of
husband and wife were purchased in trusts created
by them and under which they served as trustees,
subsequent sale of the policies to a new
irrevocable trust having a third party as trustee
would not cause the life insurance to be
includible in the gross estate because the
transfers of the policies were for full and
adequate consideration in money or money's worth.
The new trust was structured as a grantor trust,
and the IRS ruled that amounts distributed by the
trust pursuant to its terms to reimburse the
taxpayers for tax payments made by them with
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respect to the trust income would not be treated
as a retention of the right to income. Finally,
citing Jordahl v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 92 (1975),
the IRS found that the insured would not possess
incidents of ownership in any insurance policy
held in trust solely because the insured has the
right to substitute assets of similar value for
those policies.
4. Private Letter Ruling 9417005. IRS withdraws
Private Letter Ruling 9240017 concerning the
transfer of an option to a charitable remainder
trust.
5. Private Letter Ruling 9422041. Beneficiary's
status as owner under the grantor trust rules will
not preclude a QSST election by the beneficiary.
6. Private Letter Ruling 9432017. Amendment in May
of 1993 to a 1951 buy-sell agreement will not be a
"substantial modification" that would cause loss
of grandfathered status under the new Chapter 14
valuation rules. The amendment was adopted
contingent on the receipt of a favorable letter
ruling. The amendment changed the purchase price
from 50% of book value to 75% of book value,
changed the interest rate, and made other changes
in the method of payment. The IRS held that the
changes balanced out.
7. Private Letter Ruling 9438023. The exercise of a
special power of appointment over a grandfathered
generation-skipping trust to create a new trust
for a lower generation for life will not be
treated as an addition made after September 25,
1985 and will not cause a loss of the exemption
from the generation-skipping transfer tax.
II. STRUCTURED VALUE TRANSFER TECHNIQUES TO CONSIDER
1. Taxable Gifts. Unified credit gifts. are simple
and result in the perfect freeze by shifting all
future growth without paying any transfer taxes.
Because gift taxes are calculated on a tax
exclusive basis and because the dollars used to
pay the gift taxes can be removed from the donor's
gross estate, lower transfer tax costs are
involved.
2. Valuation Discounts. Proper structuring of the
ownership of the asset or entity involved in the
gift or freeze transaction to take advantage of
valuation discounts for undivided interests,
minority interests, and other circumstances can
enhance the leverage in the transaction. This .is
particularly true in view of Rev. Rul. 93-12,
1993-1 C.B. 202, holding that a minority discount
will not be disallowed solely because the
transferred interest, when aggregated with
interests held by family members, would be part of
a controlling interest.
3. Chapter 14 Freezes. Use of one of the techniques
sanctioned by sections 2701 through 2704 can add
certainty to the tax treatment of the structured
value freeze. These include preferred stock
recapitalizations, grantor retained annuity trusts
and unitrusts (GRATs and GRUTs), and buy-sell
agreements. Other techniques are qualified
personal residence trusts (QPRTs), split-purchase
annuity trusts (SPATs), and split purchases of
residences. Grantor retained income trusts
(GRITs) can continue to be used with nieces and
nephews.
4. Installment Sales. A sale made in exchange for a
long-term note can be a simple way to shift growth
without being subject to Chapter 14. Installment
sales can be used with any capital asset, and the
note can be tailored to suit the client's needs as
in Private Letter Ruling 8824043 where payment
could be demanded on 367 days' notice. Under
section 7872, the applicable federal rate is a
safe harbor interest rate for income tax purposes,
and, according to Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.
554 (1992), for gift tax purposes as well. At the
holder's death, the note may be valued at less
than face for estate tax purposes. See Regs. §
20.2031-4; Rev. Rul. 67-276, 1967-2 C.B. 321; and
Friedbera v. Comm'r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3080 (1992).
5. Stock Redemptions. This technique involves the
transfer by a senior family member of a few shares
in the C corporation to members of the next
generation and a redemption by the corporation of
the balance of the senior generation's stock in
whole or in part for installments notes. Careful
planning is required for exchange treatment under
section 302(b) (and to avoid application of the
section 318 family attribution rules) and to make
sure the terms of the note do not cause it to be
an applicable retained interest within the meaning
of section 2701(b) (1) (for example, by inclusion
of a conversion right on default).
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6. Private Annuities. Use of a private annuity
allows the seller to defer gain as with an
installment note. However, at death there is no
inclusion in the seller's gross estate. In
addition, if the seller dies before full basis
recovery, the unreported gain disappears and a
loss deduction can be claimed on the seller's
final income tax return for the unrecovered basis.
See General Counsel Memorandum 39503 (June 28,
1985) which discusses the income tax treatment.
7. Self-CancellinQ Installment Notes. A SCIN is a
hybrid using the installment approach to determine
the maximum payments to be made by the buyer and
using the private annuity approach on cessation of
payments if the seller dies early, thereby
avoiding inclusion in the gross estate. See
General Counsel Memorandum 39503 (June 28, 1985)
and Commissioner v. Frane, 998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir.
1993), for a discussion of the income tax
treatment.
8. Loans and Guarantees. Loans to family members and
the personal guaranteeing or securing of their
bank loans and other credit arrangements can
provide them with the capital needed to invest in
businesses, homes, and other appreciating assets.
Structuring a gift loan under the safe harbor
interest rate provisions of section 7872 is easy
and can be understood by the client.
9. Charitable Lead Trusts. For a family that is
otherwise charitably inclined, a lead trust offers
the opportunity for substantial discounts in
making taxable gifts. Combined with a private
foundation, very few dollars need actually leave
the control of the family.
10. Split-Dollar Life Insurance. Use of split-dollar
life insurance arrangements, particularly with
second-to-die policies owned by generation-
skipping trusts, can provide significant leverage
for the corporate dollars used to pay the
premiums.
III. VALUATION ISSUES
A. Inherent Gain Discount.
1. The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine by
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has made it virtually
impossible for a taxable corporation to sell or
distribute appreciated assets without the
realization of taxable gain.
a. Prior law protected distributions to
shareholders under certain liquidations.
Sections 331, 337.
b. Earlier law also insulated inherent gain from
tax where appreciated property was used by a
corporation to redeem stock under the
protection of section 303. Section 311(d).
2. The step up in basis at death given to the stock
of a corporation does not pass through to
appreciated assets.
a. Assets of the corporation are not considered
to be assets of a shareholder for purposes of
section 1014.
b. The basis step up under section 1014 given to
an interest in a partnership can be
transferred to the underlying assets of the
partnership through elections made available
to the personal representative of the estate.
Sections 732(d), 754.
3. The IRS position on this issue was generally
upheld by the courts prior to the 1986 repeal of
tax-free liquidations under section 337.
Cruikshank v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 162 (1947); Estate of
Piper v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979); Estate of
Andrews v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 938, 942 (1982); Ward
v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78 (1984).
a. These decisions denied discounts for any
inherent capital gains tax liability because
a liquidation of the corporation was
uncertain and because of the possibility that
gain would be avoided or minimized in the
event of a liquidation.
b. This thinking contrasts somewhat with
language in Rev. Rul. 59-60 which
acknowledges that costs of liquidation merit
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consideration in valuing a business. Rev.
Rul. 59-60, Sec. 5(b), 1959-1 C.B. 237.
4. The IRS has recently reaffirmed its position that
the inherent capital gain liability of a
corporation cannot be considered in valuing its
stock in the absence of evidence that a
liquidation is actually contemplated. Tech. Ad.
Memo. 9150001.
5. Also, the Tax Court in Estate of Ford v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1507 (1993), with
respect to the issue of liquidation costs of a
closely held corporation, held that no discount is
appropriate where the prospect of liquidation is
merely speculative, citing favorably pre-1986 case
law.
a. This position ignores the changes in the
corporate income tax laws just noted and, in
fact, Ford did not address the impact of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the pre-1986 cases.
b. The hypothetical and knowledgeable willing
buyer would certainly recognize the reduction
in the value of appreciated corporate assets
if they are reduced to cash or distributed in
a liquidation of the corporation.
c. In Obermer v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 29
(D.C. Haw. 1964) the taxpayer claimed a
discount for the inherent capital gains tax
on appreciated corporate assets in valuing
the stock of a corporation and presented
expert testimony that a buyer would consider
this potential tax liability.
d. The District Court in Obermer expressly
stated that the locked-in capital gains tax
was a proper discount in valuing the stock
and distinguished the earlier holding of the
Tax Court in Cruikshank because no expert
testimony was presented in Cruikshank on the
effect of the tax liability on the value of
the corporate stock.
e. Most recently, the Tax Court in Estate of
Gray V. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 254
(1993), accepted a discount in the value of
an Albany, Georgia newspaper for impacted
capital gain tax liabilities based on expert
testimony.
f. A discount for inherent capital gains on
corporate assets is both logical and likely,
but expert testimony will have to be
presented to sustain a discount position in
light of the current IRS stance on this
issue.
B. Appraisal Issues.
1. Appraisers are well aware of corrective measures
taken by Treasury to limit the use of faulty and
fraudulent appraisals to secure favorable tax
results.
a. Penalties are now imposed on persons who
assist in the preparation or presentation of
any portion of a return, affidavit, claim, or
other document if that person knows (or has
reason to believe) that the document will be
used in connection with any material matter
arising under internal revenue laws and would
result in an understatement of the liability
for the tax of another. Section 6701.
b. The new rules relating to the substantiation
of the value of property transferred to
charity through qualified appraisals and
qualified appraisers are well known in the
appraisal community. Regs. § 1.170A-13(c).
c. The Treasury may bar an appraiser from
practicing before the IRS or the Treasury and
may also decree that appraisals by an
appraiser will have no probative effect in
proceedings before the IRS or the Treasury.
d. As a result, appraisers asked to take
positions that may be unusual or aggressive
will require substantial support from tax
advisors.
2. Confidentiality issues are raised when appraisers
are involved in sensitive valuation matters.
a. Any appraisal secured by a taxpayer may be
subpoenaed by the IRS. McKay v. United
States, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967).
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b. Until an appraiser's position on the
valuation issue is reasonably formulated, it
may be wise to protect the appraisal process
under the attorney work product doctrine.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see,
Rule 26(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
i. In order to keep the appraisal process
within this doctrine, the appraiser
should be employed by an attorney,
receive instructions from that attorney,
confer with the attorney before preparing
a written appraisal, and be paid by the
attorney.
ii. In short, until the appraisal process has
been completed, the appraiser should be
treated as a consultant to the attorney
rather than an independent expert.
c. The information obtained by an appraiser from
a party who is not before the court in a tax
valuation proceeding cannot be considered
privileged communication and will not be
grounds for disqualification. Estate of
Halas v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 570 (1990).
C. The Buffalo Tool & Die Rule.
1. The Tax Court will no longer "split the
difference" in valuation cases. Buffalo Tool &
Die ManufacturinQ Co. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 441
(1980); Sirloin Stockade, Inc. v. Comm'r, 40
T.C.M. (CCH) 928 (1980); Strutz v. Comm'r, 40
T.C.M. (CCH) 757 (1980).
a. The court has now recognized that decisions
which split the difference between parties
encourage them to take extreme positions
which frustrate the administrative settlement
process.
b. The upshot is that a well tried and well
presented case may result in a full victory
rather than a compromise outcome.
2. Taxpayers have fared well under this principle.
Estate of McGill v. Comm'r, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 239
(1984); Estate of Gallo v. Comm'r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH)
470 (1985); Watts v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 60
(1985), aff'd, 823 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1987).
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a. In Watts the issue was whether a partnership
interest should be valued as an interest in a
going concern or on the basis of its
liquidation value. The case resulted in a
complete win for the taxpayer.
b. The following comment from the Tax Court's
opinion is instructive:
"We have now come full cycle and, after
weeks of preparation, days of trial,
hundreds of pages of paper, thousands of
dollars for lawyers, months of
consideration by the Court and minutes
reading the opinion, are back where the
petitioner started on the Form 706.
Perhaps this reemphasizes the wisdom of
Buffalo Tool and Die Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r,
supra. "
3. The taxpayer can normally employ an appraiser
contemporaneously with the relevant tax valuation
date. Appraisals made at or near the date of
valuation carry more weight than those made at a
later period in time. First Republic Bank v.
United States, 88-2 U.S.T.C. 13,786 (W.D. Tex.
1988).
4. Taxpayers can often utilize more qualified
appraisers than the IRS, and payments are normally
deductible for tax purposes. A number of cases
illustrate the mismatch in appraiser quality that
normally results in favorable decisions for
taxpayers. Estate of Spruill v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.
1197 (1987); Mast v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1355
(1989).
5. Contemporaneous appraisals are also valuable in
locking up the value of adjusted taxable gifts,
given the unfortunate results in Estate of Smith
v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 872 (1990).
D. Recoverable Costs.
1. Remember that a prevailing party may recover
reasonable litigation costs (including attorneys'
fees) in tax controversies, as well as court
costs, expert witness fees, various studies,
reports, tests, and the like. Section 7430.
2. A number of rules apply to limit or deny an award
of litigation or administrative costs, the most
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important of which is the requirement that the
prevailing party must have exhausted all
administrative remedies within the IRS as a
condition precedent to cost recovery.
Section 7430(b) (1)
a. A party's administrative remedies are
considered to have been exhausted only if the
party participates in an appeals conference.
b. This requirement does not apply, however,
unless the IRS makes available the
opportunity for an appeals conference.
3. The bad news is that the maximum rate at which
attorney's fees may be reimbursed is $75 an hour
unless the court determines a higher rate as
justified to reflect inflation.
Section 7430(c) (1) (B) (iii).
a. H.R. 4210, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights II,
passed by the House and Senate on March 20,
1992, would have increased attorney's fees to
$110 an hour, but this legislation was vetoed
by President Bush on the same day it was
approved in the House and Senate.
IV. DISCOUNT FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS.
A. In General.
1. Family investment partnerships are typically
formed for a variety of tax and nontax objectives.
2. Asset protection.
a. Gifts of limited partnership interests do not
expose the underlying family capital to
immature or spendthrift tendencies on the
part of the donee(s).
b. Transfers of limited partnership interests
are compatible with custodial donee
arrangements.
c. Limited partnership interests are relatively
secure against future matrimonial disputes.
d. The partnership format retains the investment
assets within family parameters.
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e. Many of these nontax objectives are achieved
through transfer restrictions contained in
the articles of partnership.
3. Financial benefits.
a. Collective investing often secures
opportunities foreclosed to individual family
investors.
b. Partnerships allow the investment of family
capital to be entrusted to the most able
managers in the family.
4. See generally, Eastland, "Family Limited
Partnerships: Non-Transfer Tax Benefits," 7
Probate & Property, 10 (March/April 1993).
5. Tax advantages.
a. Discounts for lack of marketability and
minority interests are frequent
characteristics of limited partnership
interests.
b. Gifts of undivided interests in the
underlying assets are normally seen as a
convenient and equitable means of
transferring wealth to the next generation.
c. Family partnerships can be created and
liquidated without substantial tax hurdles.
Sections 721, 736.
i. Be careful to avoid the investment
company rules upon formation.
Section 721; Regs. § 1.351-1(c).
ii. Income tax issues do arise whenever
certain assets -- inventory and accounts
receivable -- are present. Sections 736,
751.
iii. Gifts of limited partnership interests in
family partnerships will usually involve
Chapter 14 issues.
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B. Valuation Strategies.
1. Multiple discounts.
a. Multiple discounts may be available if a
tiered partnership structure is created, or
if the underlying partnership assets may be
discounted in addition to the outside
partnership interests.
b. Much of the overall discount may be absorbed
by the illiquidity inherent in the underlying
assets of the partnership, or in the first
tier partnership interest.
2. Retroactive adjustments.
a. It may be possible in certain situations to
avoid inadvertent, or unintended, gifts by
drafting for retroactive adjustments, if it
is subsequently determined that the assumed
values for property transferred into a family
partnership, and the limited partnership
interests taken back in return were, for any
reason, incorrect.
b. The IRS attacks adjustment clauses on the
theory espoused in Commissioner v. Procter,
142, F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944), where the
court refused to give effect to a provision
in a trust agreement excluding any portion of
a transfer in trust that was subsequently
decreed by a court to be subject to gift tax.
Cf., Harwood v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 239 (1984),
aff'd, 786 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986); Ward v.
Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78 (1986).
c. An IRS attack on a retroactive adjustment
provision failed in King v. United States,
545 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1976).
i. In this case, property was sold to a
trust on an assumed value, but the
transaction called for an adjustment in
the principal amount of the installment
sales note if the property was later
revalued.
ii. The King decision indicates that
modifying the terms of the deal, rather
than undoing the transaction altogether,
may not be against public policy.
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d. Adjustments expressly triggered by audits
will be ignored by the IRS. Rev. Rul. 86-41,
1986-1 C.B. 300.
e. On the other hand, private letter rulings
suggest that an adjustment triggered by an
outside appraisal will be honored. Priv.
Letter Rul. 8549005; see also, Priv. Letter
Rul. 8611004.
f. Adjustment language can be drafted into the
articles of partnership and also the express
provisions of any assignment agreement. The
adjustment provision should be triggered by
later appraisal, not a subsequent IRS audit
or court decision.
3. Cost issues.
a. The need for outside appraisal assistance
(which costs money) depends upon the size of
the transaction and the size of the claimed
discounts.
b. Discount levels above 35% are risky and call
for expert backup.
c. Discounts of 25%, or lower, are relatively
safe.
d. Obviously, there is a gray area between 25%
and 35%, as a practical matter.
e. Note the incompatibility between the special
use valuation rules in section 2032A and the
use of normal discounts. Maddux v. Comm'r,
93 T.C.M. (CCH) 228 (1989).
C. Chapter 14 Problems.
1. Section 2704 was enacted, according to clear
legislative history, to thwart the results in
Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 106
(1987), and Estate of Watts v. Commissioner, 51
T.C.M. (CCH) 60 (1985), aff'd, 823 F.2d 483 (11th
Cir. 1987).
a. Both Harrison and Watts allow discounts at
death for partnership interests retained by a
-16-
decedent in limited and general partnerships,
respectively.
b. These discounts were triggered by the concept
of lapsing values, since the recipient of
former controlling or liquid general
partnership interests received, as a result
of the transfer, the econoiic rights to an
interest that no longer contained control or
any element of liquidity.
2. Section 2704(a).
a. Taxes the differential in value of a
partnership interest between the moment
before and the moment after death to the
extent the differential is attributable to
the lapse of voting or liquidation rights.
b. For example, following the death of the
holder of a general partnership interest
which allowed the holder to force a
partnership liquidation and receive the
liquidation value of the holder's interest in
the underlying partnership assets, an
assignee of the interest can no longer force
the liquidation in the absence of a special
provision in the articles of partnership
allowing that action.
i. In other words, local law typically
divests the recipient of a general
partnership interest of the management
and liquidation rights attributable to
that interest.
ii. Limited partnership agreements usually
treat the recipient as either an
assignee, or, at best, a substitute
limited partner without the rights
formerly enjoyed by the deceased or
transferring general partner.
c. The differential in value subject to tax
under the new section 2704(a) rule will be
roughly equivalent to the discounts formerly
applied to the general and limited
partnership interests of the decedents in the
Harrison and Watts cases.
d. The lapse which is treated as a transfer
under the statute is the lapse of a voting
-17-
right or a liquidation right. The
liquidation right involved means a right or
ability to compel the partnership to acquire
all, or a portion, of the holder's interest
in the entity. Regs. § 25.2704-1(a) (2)
(iv)(v).
e. The following state law provisions applicable
to limited partnerships that last for a set
term are applicable to the analysis here:
i. Limited partners cannot withdraw from the
partnership until it terminates.
ii. All partners have to agree to a
dissolution of the partnership.
iii. If there is more than one general
partner, no general partner unilaterally
can force partnership dissolution by
withdrawing.
iv. A general partner may be assessed damages
for withdrawing before the end of the set
term, and any effort to withdraw entitles
the general partner to a repurchase of
the general partnership (but not the
limited partnership) interest at fair
value, minus any damages caused by the
early withdrawal.
v. The combination of these rules sets up
the liquidity discount for limited
partnership interests which are "locked
in" until the end of the partnership
term.
f. The interests of the senior members in a
family limited partnership are typically
allocated primarily to the limited
partnership interests taken back when the
partnership is formed, thereby allocating a
relatively small portion of the underlying
assets to the general partnership interests
that may be subject to early withdrawal.
g. Whenever there are several general partners,
none of them has a unilateral ability to
liquidate the partnership unless the articles
of partnership provide otherwise.
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i. This means that several general partners
contributing property to the limited
partnership effectively lock themselves
in with respect to the underlying assets
allocable to limited, rather than
general, partnership interests taken back
upon formation of the entity.
ii. This is not unlike the result which
occurs when three persons transfer an
equal amount of property to a corporation
in exchange for one-third of the
outstanding stock of that entity; each
gives up liquidity with respect to the
transferred property and takes back an
equal interest that is subject to the
rights of others in the resulting
corporation.
iii. No gift tax can be asserted under these
circumstances because the exchange does
not result in a transfer of property
between the general partners in the
limited partnership context or the equal
stockholders in the corporate context.
Regs. § 25.2511-1(h) (1); see, United
States v. Gordon, 406 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.
1969).
3. Section 2704(b)
a. Enacted to prevent family partners from
forming a partnership, restricting the
interests to produce valuation discounts,
transferring interests for estate planning
purposes, and then liquidating the
partnership when all estate planning
objectives have been satisfied.
b. Operates by ignoring applicable restrictions
in valuing interests in controlled family
partnerships and corporations. This new rule
was not, however, intended to eliminate
fractionalization discounts that existed
under prior law. Conf. Rept., H.R. 5835,
101st Cong. at 157 (Oct. 27, 1990).
c. The definition of an applicable restriction
for this purpose is a limitation on the
ability to liquidate the entity if it is more
restrictive than the limitations than the
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limitations normally applicable under state
law. Regs. § 25.2704-2(b).
d. It seems clear that Congress did not intend
to change existing case law for transfers of
limited partnership interests in partnerships
that exist for a set period of time.
e. When a general partner transfers limited
partnership interests, no lapse will occur if
the general partner does not have a
unilateral right to liquidate the partnership
and the transferee of the limited partnership
interest either receives the economic rights
of that interest as an assignee or becomes a
substitute limited partner.
i. The lapse rule is covered in Regulations
section 25.2704-1(f), Ex. 5.
ii. Neither an assignee of a limited
partnership interest nor a substitute
limited partner has the right, under
state law, to force a liquidation of the
partnership or require a purchase of
their transferred limited partnership
interests -- in short, normal state law
restrictions, not section 2704(b)
applicable restrictions, support the
valuation discounts in question.
4. General thoughts.
a. The Chapter 14 rules apply to controlled
family partnerships and corporations formed
after October 7, 1990.
b. Note that this is a relatively new statutory
scheme with new interpretative regulations, a
risk that should be pointed out to the client
in any case.
c. A good review of these discount family
partnership valuation issues may be found in
Eastland, "Family Limited Partnerships:
Transfer Tax Benefits," 7 Probate & Property
59 (July/August 1993).
d. See generally, Wallace, "Now You See It, Now
You Don't -- Valuation Conundrums in Estate
Planning," 1990 Miami Estate PlanninQ
Institute 8-1.
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V. INSTALLMENT SALES
A. General Observations.
1. A current sale of property to younger family
members (or trusts for their benefit) in exchange
for an installment note remains an effective
estate freeze technique.
a. The sale avoids gift tax liability so long as
the transfer is made in exchange for a note
bearing an interest rate equal to the
applicable federal rate ("AFR") published
every month.
b. The sale will fix the value of property
retained by the Seller at the value of the
note, thereby transferring future growth in
the subject asset to younger generations;
therefore, installment sales like all estate
freeze transactions, are most effective for
property currently at depressed values.
2. Installment sales can occur with stock of a
subchapter S corporation.
a. Sales of such stock to a trust can be
structured so long as the trust is properly
divided into separate trusts for each
beneficiary. Section 1361(d) (3).
i. Each separate trust must have only one
current income beneficiary.
ii. Any corpus distributed during the
beneficiary's life can be distributed
only to that beneficiary.
iii. The beneficiary's income interest must
terminate at the earlier of the
beneficiary's death or termination of the
trust.
iv. Upon termination of the trust during the
beneficiary's life, the trust assets must
be distributed to the beneficiary.
b. Alternatively, the trust purchasing
subchapter S stock can be structured as a
grantor trust. Section 1361(c) (2) (A) (i).
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i. Grantor trust status can be changed
opportunistically according to the
transferor's ability (or desire) to
further "leverage" the transfer tax
savings by assuming the trust's income
tax obligations.
a. Consider inclusion in the trust of
an administrative power under.
section 675 which can be waived or
released by the grantor or trustee.
b. Alternatively, if the trustee is
given certain discretionary powers,
the addition or removal of
independent trustees can be used to
change the grantor trust status of
a trust under section 674.
ii. The ability to repeatedly "opt in" and
"opt out" of grantor trust status has not
been fully tested in the courts.
3. A transaction at fair market value will allow the
seller to postpone gain, although a basis step up
otherwise available under section 1014 will be
lost.
a. Treatment of the transferor's gain under the
installment method is available even if the
note is secured. This probably is not the
case with a sale in exchange for a private
annuity. Bell v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 469 (1973);
212 Corp. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 788 (1978); cf.
Stern v. Comm'r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1 (gain
recognized ratably if private annuity
unsecured).
b. For reasons discussed below, providing
security for the note may help prevent
recharacterization of the installment sale as
a transaction subject to section 2036.
4. The members of the purchasing younger generation
may be able to deduct interest paid on the note as
investment interest (to the extent of their
investment income). Section 163(d).
5. At the transferor's death, the note may be valued
at less than its face value. Regs. § 20.2031-4;
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Rev. Rul. 67-276, 1967-2 C.B. 321; Friedberg v.
Comm'r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3080 (1992).
B. Applicable Federal Rate Issues.
1. If section 1274 applies to an installment sale
between the transferor and the trust, the note
issued in favor of the transferor must bear AFR
interest to avoid both imputation of interest and
an unintended gift tax.
a. The AFR is defined in section 1274(d) and in
Proposed Regulations section 1.1274-6. The
AFR is published monthly bythe Treasury in a
published revenue ruling.
b. A short-term AFR applies to debt instruments
of up to three years maturity; a mid-term AFR
applies to debt instruments with maturities
longer than three years but not over nine
years; a long-term AFR applies to debt
instruments with a term of more than nine
years.
c. The basic AFR rate is expressed as an annual
rate based on semi-annual compounding but
equivalent rates based on annual, quarterly,
and monthly compounding are also published.
d. It may not be possible to analyze an
installment obligation which requires partial
payments prior to maturity simply by
reference to the short-term, mid-term,-or
long-term rates, i.e., should the same AFR
apply to the principal payment due in year
two and the principal payment due in year 10?
i. The taxpayer may elect to use the AFR
applicable to the final principal payment
date. Prop. Regs. § 1.1274-6(d) (1).
a. This may require an
inappropriately high AFR in the
case of a "steep" yield curve when
long-term rates are considerably
higher than short-term rate).
b. However, it may work to the
taxpayer's advantage in the case
of an "inverted" yield curve in
which long-term rates are lower
than short-term rates.
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ii. Separate tables are available to
determine the appropriate AFR for "self-
amortizing" or level principal
obligations. Prop. Regs. § 1.1274-
6(d) (2).
iii. Finally, a present value approach, using
an AFR applicable to each principal
payment, is available. Prop. Regs.
§ 1.1274-6(d) (3).
2. Sales to grantor trusts.
a. Section 1274(c)(1) provides that the
statutory rules apply to any debt instrument
given in consideration for the sale or
exchange of property.
i. Proposed regulations provide that the
term "sale or exchange" means any
transaction treated as a sale or exchange
"for tax purposes." Prop. Regs.
§ 1.1274-1(a) (1).
ii. The statute, therefore, will not apply to
a transaction between a grantor and
grantor trust unless it constitutes a
sale or exchange for federal income tax
-purposes.
b. In Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184, the IRS
ruled that a transfer of property by the
trustee of a grantor trust to the grantor of
the trust is not recognized as a sale for
federal income tax purposes.
i. In that ruling, the grantor, A, funded a
trust with stock with a basis of $20x and
subsequently bought the stock, then worth
$40x, from the trust in exchange for a
promissory note for $40x. When A later
sold the stock to an unrelated party for
$50x the IRS ruled that A's basis in the
shares received from the trust was equal
to $20x "because the basis of the shares
was not adjusted during the period that
[the trustee] held them."
ii. The IRS ruled that A was considered to be
the owner of the promissory note held by
the trust and that the transfer from the
trust to A was not recognized as a sale
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for federal income tax purposes because A
is both the maker and owner of the
promissory note.
c. The IRS specifically declined to follow a
contrary decision involving similar facts,
Rothstein v. United States, 735 F.2d 704 (2d
Cir. 1984), because of its "position of
treating the owner of an entire trust as the
owner of the trust's assets." Id. If the
IRS applied this interpretation of the
grantor trust rules to section 1274, it
presumably would hold that a sale between a
grantor and a grantor trust should not be
considered a sale or exchange of property for
purposes of section 1274(c) (1).
d. No reported authority has considered the
applicability of Rev. Rul. 85-13 to
section 1274. Analogous cases and rulings
applying Rev. Rul. 85-13 to other situations,
however, suggest that the statute would not
apply to a note between a grantor and his
grantor trust.
i. In Rev. Rul. 87-61, 1987-2 C.B. 219, the
IRS ruled that the section 1491 excise
tax on transfers of appreciated property
by United States citizens or residents to
foreign trusts did not apply at the time
of a transfer by a grantor to a foreign
grantor trust but rather applied at the
time that the grantor ceased to be the
owner of the trust.
ii. In Rev. Rul. 88-103, 1988-2 C.B. 304, the
IRS ruled that if a taxpayer's property
is involuntarily converted into money and
the taxpayer's grantor trust, rather than
the taxpayer, purchases replacement
property, the purchase can qualify the
taxpayer's gain for nonrecognition under
section 1033. Citing Rev. Rul. 85-13,
the IRS held that "[w]hether replacement
property is purchased by the grantor or
by the grantor's trust is of no
consequence for purposes of Section
1033."
iii. See also, Rev. Rul. 90-7, 1990-1 C.B. 153
(certificate holder in investment trust
classified as grantor trust does not
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recognize gain or loss when the
certificates are exchanged for a
proportionate share of the trust's
assets).
e. The IRS and the courts have not always held
consistently that a grantor trust has no
independent tax significance.
i. The leading case in which the IRS
successfully argued that a grantor trust
should be accorded separate entity status
is W & W Fertilizer Corp. v. United
States, 527 F.2d 621 (Ct. Cls. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976). In
W & W Fertilizer Corp., the question
presented was whether a grantor trust or
its grantor was the owner of stock for
purposes of section 1371(a) (2), which
provided that a subchapter S corporation
could have as shareholders only
individuals and estates. The Court of
Claims recognized the trust as a separate
entity owning the shares in large part
because Regulations section 1.1371-1(e)
explicitly provided that a grantor trust
did not qualify as a subchapter S
corporation shareholder.
ii. In 1976, Congress amended section
1371(a) (2) to reverse the result of W. & W
Fertilizer Corp., reinforcing the
commentators' treatment of the case as an
exception to the majority of the
precedents which require that grantor
trusts be ignored "whenever income tax
liability of the grantor is at stake."
See, e.q., Ascher, "When to Ignore
Grantor Trusts: The Precedents, a
Proposal, and a Prediction," 41 Tax Law
Review 253 (1986); Note, "Treatment of
the Grantor Trust as a Separate Entity,"
32 Tax Law Review 409 (1977).
3. The transferor and the trustee of the trust may
later want to renegotiate the interest rate
payable on the note as the AFR changes through a
replacement note bearing interest at the AFR in
effect when the renegotiation occurs.
a. Obviously, if the transferor desires to
further leverage the transfer tax advantages
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of the installment sale transaction, he will
only renegotiate the loan when the AFR
decreases in order to reduce the trust's
interest payments.
b. No authority supports or contradicts the
ability of the transferor and the trustee of
the trust to renegotiate the terms of the
note on such an opportunistic basis.
i. The transaction should not be subject to
challenge as a gift loan under
section 7872 because the use of the AFR
at any point in time will prevent
characterization of the replacement note
as evidencing a gift loan.
ii. The opportunistic renegotiation of the
interest rate theoretically could be
challenged under an extension of Dickman
v. United States, 465 U.S. 330 (1984),
although it clearly does not fall within
the facts or theory of that case.
iii. On the other hand, a renegotiation
feature cannot be built into the original
note. If the AFR at the time of the sale
is 61k, a note bearing interest monthly at
a rate equal to "the lesser of 6% or the
AFR prevailing each month" clearly would
be subject to section 1274 adjustment.
Variable rate notes are governed by
.separate rules. See Regs. § 1.7872-3(e).
iv. It is advisable to avoid an upfront
agreement to renegotiate only when rates
decline.
C. Dispositions of Installment ObliQations.
1. Lifetime dispositions.
a. A transfer (or cancellation) of the
installment obligation by the transferor will
trigger gain. Section 453B(a). This rule
applies even to the Qift of an installment
obligation. Rev. Rul. 79-371, 1979-2 C.B.
294.
b. A renunciation by a grantor of powers which
cause a trust to be classified as a grantor
trust is treated as a transfer of ownership
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of the trust assets by the grantor to the
trust, which, upon such renunciation, becomes
a "separate taxable entity, independent of
its grantor." Regs. § 1.1001-2(c), Ex. 5;
see also, Madorin v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 667
(1985).
2. Modifications.
a. Most modifications to installment obligations
do not constitute taxable dispositions.
i. In Private Letter Ruling 8932011
modifications to a note did not
substantially change the rights of the
seller and did not constitute a taxable
disposition of the installment obligation
where: (i) payments of principal and
interest on the unpaid balance of the
note were reduced retroactively; (ii)
simple interest was increased from 9% to
10%; (iii) a new quarterly payment was
added based on a percentage of cash flow
from the property; and (iv) a clause was
added recognizing the seller's right to
use part of the property sold.
ii. In Rev. Rul. 82-122, 1982-1 C.B. 86, the
IRS ruled that the substitution of a new
obligor coupled with an increase of the
note interest rate was not a taxable
disposition.
b. A taxable disposition is deemed to have
occurred, however, if substantial
modifications of the installment obligation
are made and the rights of the seller are
materially changed.
i. In Rev. Rul. 82-188, 1982-2 C.B. 90, the
IRS ruled that a disposition occurred
when the obligor substantially increased
the face amount of its outstanding
installment obligation in consideration
for the taxpayer's waiver of his right to
convert the obligation into common stock
of the debtor corporation.
ii. In Rev. Rul. 87-19, 1987-1 C.B. 249, the
IRS ruled that a bondholder's waiver of
an-otherwise automatic interest rate
adjustment clause, such that the
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bondholder received a lower rate of
interest in exchange for the debtor's
satisfaction of requirements necessary
for the bond to be tax exempt, was a
material change resulting in a taxable
disposition under section 1001.
3. In Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner,
499 U.S. 554 (1991), the subject taxpayer, a
savings and loan, sold mortgage participation
interests to another financial institution in
exchange for substantially identical mortgage
participation interests.
a. The Supreme Court held that the exchanged
properties were materially different because
the participation interests exchanged by the
taxpayer were derived from loans made to
different obligors and secured by different
homes. The Court therefore allowed the
taxpayer to recognize losses on the
transaction under section 1001.
b. Although Cottage Savings did not deal with
the modification of a debt instrument, the
case suggests that parties to a debt
instrument should be able to adjust certain
terms of their instrument without the
modification rising to the level of a deemed
exchange.
4. In 1992 the IRS responded with proposed (non-
exclusive) regulations under section 1001 dealing
with modifications of debt instruments. Only
"significant" modifications result in a taxable
exchange.
5. Proposed regulations -- definition of
modification.
a. The proposed regulations apply whether a
modification is accomplished by an actual
change of instruments or by an alteration of
the original instrument. Prop. Regs.
§ 1.1001-3(b).
b. A modification includes any alteration in any
legal right or obligation of the issuer or a
holder of a debt instrument. Prop. Regs.
§ 1.1001-3(c) (1).
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c. An alteration that occurs by the operation of
the original terms of the instrument is not a
modification. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(c) (2) (i). For example, if the interest
rate is to be "reset each 49 days by a
remarketing agent based on an objective
standard," the resets do not alter any legal
right or obligation and therefore are not
modifications. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-3(d),
Ex. 1.
d. A party's exercise or waiver of a right under
the instrument is not a modification if it
arises "by operation of the original terms
[and] is unilateral." Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(c) (2) (i). For example, if the issuer is
entitled to reduce the interest rate from 9%
to 8% in the event it attains a specified
credit rating, an exercise of this right is
not a modification. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(d), Ex. 4.
i. An exercise of a right is not unilateral
in three circumstances:
a. where it "creates a right in the
other party to alter or terminate
the instrument." Prop. Regs.
§ 1.1001-3(c) (2) (i) (A) (1);
b. if it "requires consent of the
other party, unless that consent
may not be unreasonably withheld."
Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(c) (2) (i) (A) (2); or
C. if it requires "consideration,
unless the amount of consideration
is fixed as the issue date." Prop.
Regs. § 1.1001-3(c) (2) (i) (A) (3).
ii. A waiver is not unilateral if it
represents a "settlement of terms among
the parties." Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(c) (2) (i) (B). For example, a workout is
a modification even if it consists only
of a reduction of the interest rate or
stated principal. Generally, a waiver is
a settlement if the waiving party
receives a benefit (other than the mere
enhancement of goodwill or reputation)
from the other party to the instrument.
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e. No modification results from a "temporary
failure of the issuer to perform its
obligations under an instrument, including a
delay in payment." Prop. Regs. § 1,1001-
3(c) (2) (ii). Also, "an agreement by the
holder to temporarily stay collection or
waive an acceleration clause or similar
default right is not a modification." Id.
f. Generally, an alteration resulting "in an
instrument or property right that is not debt
for federal income tax purposes" is a
modification even if it occurs pursuant to
the instrument's original terms. Prop. Regs.
§ 1.1001-3(c) (3). However, an exercise of a
right to convert debt into stock of the
issuer is not a modification if the
conversion right is included in the
instrument's original terms.
6. Proposed regulations -- definition of
"significant" modification.
a. A change in yield is not significant unless
it increases or decreases the annual yield by
more than 25 basis points. Prop. Regs.
§ 1.1001-3(e) (1) (ii).
b. An extension of an instrument on a maturity
date is a significant modification if the
date is delayed by more than five years or
50% of the original term, whichever is less.
Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-3(e) (2) (ii). Any other
deferral of a payment is significant if it is
material. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-3(e) (2) (i).
For example, if a bond requires interest to
be paid annually, but several years into the
bond's term the holder agrees to permit
interest for the succeeding four years to be
deferred and paid simultaneously with the
fifth succeeding year's interest, such
deferral of interest is material even if the
deferred interest bears interest at a rate
such that the yield is not affected. Prop.
Regs. § 1.1001-3(g), Ex. 4.
c. A partial prepayment is not a significant
modification, but any modification in the
terms of the remaining portion may be
significant. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(e) (2) (iii).
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d. The addition or elimination of a right in the
issuer to call the instrument or a right of
the holder to put the instrument to the
issuer is significant if the call or put has
significant value when it is added or
deleted. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-3(e) (2) (iv).
Similarly, a modification of a call or put is
significant if the value of the call or put
changes "significantly" as a result of the
amendment.
e. A change in obligor is usually a significant
modification unless the change occurs in a
transaction to which section 381(a) applies
and the new obligor is the acquiring
corporation. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(e) (3) (i).
f. However, a change in the obligor is not
significant, regardless of the circumstances,
if the obligation is without recourse. The
addition of an obligor is not significant
unless it is intended to circumvent the
foregoing rules. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(e) (3) (ii).
g. No significant modification results from a
subordination of a debt instrument to other
debt of the issuer. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(e) (3) (v). On the other hand, the addition
or material alteration of a guarantee or
other form of credit enhancement on a
nonrecourse instrument is a significant
modification. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(e) (3) (iii). An addition or modification of
a guarantee or other credit enhancement to a
recourse instrument is not significant
"unless the guarantor or credit enhancement
provider is, in substance, substituted as the
obligor on the debt instrument and the change
is intended to circumvent the rules regarding
a change in obligor."
h. Changes in the collateral for a recourse
obligation are never significant
modifications. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(e) (3) (iv). Generally, a change in the
collateral securing a nonrecourse obligation
is a significant modification if a
substantial portion of the collateral is
released or replaced with other property and
the release or replacement is not pursuant to
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the instrument's original terms. However,
such a change is not significant if the
collateral is fungible or otherwise of a type
where the particular unit pledged as security
are unimportant. Also, adjustment and
improvements of the collateral for a non-
recourse obligation are not significant.
i. A modification is significant if it changes a
debt instrument into an instrument that is
not debt for federal tax purposes. Prop.
Regs. § 1.1001-3(e) (4) (i).
j. A change in the interest rate from variable
to fixed, or vice versa, is not a
modification if it is pursuant to the
original terms of the instrument. However,
if it is a modification, any one of the
following changes is significant:
i. A change of a fixed rate instrument to a
variable rate instrument for a contingent
payment obligation;
ii. A change of a variable rate instrument to
a fixed rate obligation or a contingent
payment obligation; or
iii. A change of a contingent payment
obligation to a variable or fixed rate
instrument. Prop. Regs. § 1.1001-
3(e) (4) (ii).
k. A modification. is significant if it changes a
recourse obligation into a nonrecourse
obligation or vice versa. Prop. Regs.
§ 1.1001-3(e) (4) (iv). However, the IRS is
weighing the possibility of adding an
exception for a change from recourse to non-
recourse based upon the adequacy of the
collateral securing the loan.
7. Testamentary dispositions.
a. The transfer of an installment obligation at
death is not a taxable disposition. The
remaining unreported gain from the obligation
constitutes income in respect of a decedent,
and is reported only as payments under the
obligation are received by the estate or
beneficiaries. Section 691(a) (4); Regs.
§ 1.691(a)-5(a).
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b. Taxable gain is triggered, however, if the
installment obligation is transferred at
death to the obligor. Section 691(a) (5).
c. Of course, a transfer of the obligation by
the estate or the beneficiaries also triggers
gain.
d. In Rev. Rul. 76-100, 1976-1 C.B. 123, the IRS
ruled that the grantors of a trust who
transferred an installment obligation to the
trust were treated as owners of the entire
trust and that the deferred gain represented
by the installment obligation was income in
respect of a decedent.
e. In Sun First National Bank of Orlando v.
United States, 607 F.2d 1347 (Ct. Cls. 1975),
withdrawing 587 F.2d 1073 (Ct. Cls. 1978),
the subject grantor transferred stock to a
grantor trust, which later sold the stock for
cash and promissory notes and reported the
gain on the sale on the installment basis
pursuant to section 453. The trustee
realized the capital gain as income and paid
most of the income to the grantor, as income
beneficiary. The grantor died before the
notes were fully paid. When the Tax Court
upheld the IRS's determination that the
property of the trust was includible in the
grantor's estate under section 2036, the
grantor's estate filed a refund claim
asserting that the gain on the sale of the
notes paid after her death was income in
respect of a decedent so that the recipient
of such income (i.e., the trust) was entitled
to a deduction under section 691(c) for
estate tax paid on that income. The IRS
rejected the refund claim on the grounds that
the gain on the notes was not income in
respect of a decedent.
i. The Court of Claims held that because the
grantor was viewed as the owner of the
installment obligations for federal tax
purposes, those notes were "acquired by"
the trust by reason of the death of the
decedent. Implicitly, the court
concluded that the notes, though owned
for federal income tax purposes by the
grantor during her life, passed to the
trust upon the grantor's death.
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ii. A dissenting opinion observed that this
transfer occurred "(as if by magic).
by some unexplained method, which was not
by a testamentary bequest or any other
known or proven conveyance."
f. Neither Sun First National Bank nor Rev. Rul.
76-100 considered the case of an installment
note executed by a grantor trust in favor of
its grantor. In Sun First National Bank, the
subject note was executed by the trustee of a
grantor trust in favor of a third party. In
Rev. Rul. 76-100, the subject note was
executed by a third party in favor of the
grantor and transferred to the trust.
Nonetheless, the reasoning of the majority in
Sun First National Bank, which held that
section 691(a) (4) applies upon the passing
(to use the dissent's term, "as if by magic")
of a note from the grantor to the trust at
the death of the grantor, suggests that the
death of a grantor holding a note executed by
his grantor trust would result in recognition
of income in respect of a decedent.
8. Self-cancelling notes.
a. Self-cancelling installment notes were
favored vehicles under prior law.
i. The value of the note disappeared at
death, leaving nothing to be included in
the gross estate of the holder. Cain v.
Comm'r, 37 T.C. 185 (1961); Estate of
Moss v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1239 (1980), ac.
1981-1 C.B. 2.
ii. Arguably, no income tax resulted from the
cancellation provision when it was
triggered. Miller v. Usry, 160 F.Supp.
368 (W.D. La. 1958).
b. The addition of sections 453B(f) and
691(a) (5) by The Installment Sale Revision
Act of 1980 reversed the income tax result
just noted.
i. Whenever an installment obligation is
cancelled or otherwise becomes
unenforceable, the obligation is treated
as if it were disposed of in a
transaction other than a sale or
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exchange, and, if the obligor and obligee
are related, the fair market value of the
obligation cannot be less than the face
amount. Section 453B(f).
ii. An installment obligation transferred at
death is excluded from this recognition
rule, unless the obligation is
transferred by bequest, devise, or
inheritance to the obligor or is
cancelled by the personal representative
of the estate. Sections 453B(c),
691(a) (5).
c. In Estate of Frane v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.
341 (1992), the Tax Court held that gain was
recognized upon the death of the holder of an
installment note which was automatically
cancelled upon death by the express terms of
the note.
i. Here, the subject transferor sold
property to his four children in exchange
for a 20-year installment note at a time
when his life expectancy exceeded 20
years.
ii. In fact, however, the transferor lived to
receive only two installments and
recognized income on those installments
as if he lived the entire 20 years.
iii. The Tax Court held that the cancellation
of the notes resulted in taxable gain to
the decedent/transferor under
section 453B. However, the Court of
Appeals, citing section 691(a), held that
the cancellation of the installment
obligation must be treated as a
disposition of the obligation by the
decedent's estate causing it to recognize
income in respect of a decedent. Comm'r
v. Estate of Frane, 998 F.2d 567 (8th
Cir. 1993).
iv. The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the self-cancellation
clause in the notes created a
"contingency" affecting the total
purchase price to be paid for the stock
and that the obligation therefore was not
cancelled within the meaning of either
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section 453 or section 691. The Court of
Appeals affirmed this portion of the Tax
Court's judgment.
v. The appellate decision is consistent with
Rev. Rul. 86-72, 1986-1 C.B. 253, and
General Counsel Memorandum 39503, both of
which held that section 691(a) (5) applies
when the payee of a self-cancelling
installment note dies.
d. This decision causes inevitable comparisons
between installment sales and private annuity
transactions.
i. Both transactions eliminate assets from
the gross estate of the seller.
ii. Self-cancelling notes can be secured, but
a secured private annuity forfeits any
deferral by the seller. Bell v. Comm'r,
60 T.C. 469 (1973); 212 Corp. v. Comm'r,
70 T.C. 788 (1979).
iii. If the fair market value of the property
transferred in either transaction exceeds
the present value of the obligation
received, a gift tax liability is
incurred. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B.
43; Gen. Coun. Mem. 39503.
iv. For income tax purposes, the purchaser of
property in exchange for a private
annuity is not entitled to an interest
deduction, even though the annuity
payment may in fact reflect either an
actual or imputed interest factor.
v. Unlike the installment sale situation,
there is no postdeath realization of
income by the holder of an annuity
contract, although his basis in the
property is adjusted.
vi. The parties should not use an unfunded
trust to purchase the property in a
private annuity transaction. If such a
trust is used, the transaction will be
characterized as a gift to the trust with
a reserved life estate, rather than as an
annuity, and the value of the trust
property will be included in the gross
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estate. Lazarus v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 854
(1972), aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.
1975); LaFargue v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 40
(1979); Rev. Rul. 68-183, 1968-1 C.B.
308. The same issue can arise for
installment sales as well (see the
discussion in Paragraph D, infra).
vii. In the installment sale, the basis of the
purchaser should equal the purchase price
of the property, including any premium
paid for a cancellation feature. This
provides an advantage over the private
annuity transaction where obligor's basis
is adjusted if the annuitant dies
prematurely.
e. The question is whether a self-cancelling
installment note transaction still compares
favorably with a private annuity despite the
taxpayer's loss in Estate of Frane with
respect to the income tax liability incurred
upon cancellation of the note.
i. Each transaction eliminates assets from
the gross estate, except to the extent
the seller or annuitant fails to expend
the payments received.
ii. Each transaction freezes the value of the
property in question and passes any
appreciation in the asset sold to the
next generation.
iii. Unlike a private annuity, an installment
sale can be secured without jeopardizing
installment reporting of gain.
iv. Unlike a private annuity, an installment
sale can be structured with flexibility,
since self-cancelling installment notes
do not require substantially constant
annual payments; principal need not be
payable until future dates, and interest
may be accrued.
v. From the purchaser's standpoint, the
self-cancelling installment note is
superior to a private annuity transaction
because of his ability to deduct interest
on the installment note (to the extent of
investment income) and, presumably, his
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ability to claim a cost basis in the
asset purchased.
D. Potential Recharacterization of Sale As a Transfer With
Retained Interest.
1. The IRS has attempted to recharacterize sales of
property to trusts in exchange for fixed annuity
payments as transfers with a retained life
interest for purposes of sections 677 and 2036.
These cases involve transactions analogous, though
not identical, to installment sale transactions
and therefore merit careful attention.
a. Treatment of the trust as a grantor trust
under section 677 may not always be
problematic. In fact it may be desirable as
a means of further "leveraging" the transfer
tax consequences of the transaction by having
the grantor pay the younger generation's
income tax liability.
b. On the other hand, inclusion of the trust
property in the transferor's estate under
section 2036 obviously would defeat the
purpose of the freeze.
c. The Supreme Court has made the IRS's task a
difficult one. In Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274 (1958), it held
that an irrevocable assignment of rights in
life insurance policies combined with a
retention of annuity contracts issued in
conjunction with the policies did not subject
the proceeds of the life insurance policies
to inclusion under the predecessor to
section 2036. In an oft-cited footnote, the
Court observed that:
"Where a decedent, not in contemplation
of death, has transferred property to
another in return for a promise to make
periodic payments to the transferor for
his lifetime, it has been held that
these payments are not income from the
transferred property so as to include
the property in the estate of the
decedent. . . . In these cases, the
promise is a personal obligation of the
transferee, the obligation is usually
not chargeable to the transferred
property, and the size of the payments
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is not determined by the size of the
actual income from the transferred
property at the time the payments are
made."
356 U.S. at 277, n.8 (citations
omitted).
d. As a result, the IRS has been unable
successfully to recharacterize a sale-annuity
transaction as a transfer with a retained
life interest unless (i) it can point to a
substantial link between the income produced
by the transferred asset and the annuity
payments made to the transferor or (ii) the
transfer is illusory because the transferor
retains control over the transferred
property.
2. Pro-IRS recharacterization cases.
a. Cases involving a link between the
transferred assets and the retained annuity.
i. In Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824
(9th Cir. 1975), aff'q, 58 T.C. 854
(1972), the subject grantor nominally
funded an offshore trust and sold stock
of a corporation wholly owned by the
grantor to the trust in exchange for an
annuity payable during the joint lives of
the grantor and his wife. As part of a
prearranged plan, the trust then sold the
transferred stock to the issuing
corporation in exchange for a note which
yielded exactly as much as the annual
annuity payments. The court held that
under section 677 the grantor's income
included the purported annuity payments
because the transfer of stock to the
trust in consideration for the annuity
payments was in fact a transfer subject
to a reserved income interest, rather
than a sale. The factors relied upon by
the court included that:
a. The trust had no assets other than
the nominal sum with which it was
initially funded and the note
received as consideration for its
sale of the stock;
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b. The note was nonnegotiable and
could not be assigned, so the
annuity payments could only be paid
from interest on the note;
C. The yield of the note was exactly
equal to the annual annuity
payment;
d. The corpus of the trust was to
remain intact for ultimate
distribution to the trust
beneficiaries in exactly the same
way as it would have had the
transaction been structured as a
transfer in trust with a reserved
income interest;
e. The arrangement did not involve a
down payment, interest on the
deferred purchase pride, or
security for the purchase price;
and
f. There was a substantial disparity
between the fair market value of
the stock transferred and the
actuarial value of the annuity
payments.
ii. In Schwartz v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 229
(1947), the subject decedent transferred
property to her children in exchange for
an annuity of $7,000 per year. The
children immediately contributed the
property to a trust in which the decedent
was given a life interest. When the
income of the trust property was less
than $7,000, the children did not pay the
difference between the $7,000 and the
amount of the income to the decedent.
The Tax Court therefore held that the
property was includible in the decedent's
gross estate under the predecessor of
section 2036.
iii. See also, Samuel v. Commissioner, 306
F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1962), where
section 677 was applied to grantor who,
as trustee of a trust, did not make
annuity payments in years in which trust
income was insufficient.
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b. Retained control cases.
i. In Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757
(1972), the subject grantors established
a series of off-shore trusts and sold
stock to the trusts in exchange for
annuities. The Tax Court held that the
income of the trust was taxable to the
grantors under section 677 because the
grantors retained control over the trust
property through an advisory committee on
which they could serve.
ii. See also, Holland v. Commissioner, 47
B.T.A. 807 (1942), where purported sale
of stock to children disregarded for
purposes of section 2036 where stock held
by decedent as security, decedent
retained voting rights, children not
permitted to sell or assign stock, and
decedent retained "salary for life" but
performed no services to corporation.
3. Pro-taxpayer recharacterization cases.
a. As a general rule, courts have rejected the
IRS's efforts to recharacterize sale-annuity
transactions structured so that either:
(i) the annuity payments are not tied to the
yield of the transferred asset or (ii) the
transferor does not retain control over the
transferred assets inconsistent with his
status an annuitant-creditor.
i. For example, in LaFarque v. Commissioner,
73 T.C. 40 (1979), rev'd in part and
aff'd in part, 689 F.2d 845
(9th Cir. 1982), the subject grantor,
"pursuant to an overall plan," nominally
funded a trust and then transferred
assets to the trust in exchange for
annuity payments.. The court held that
the transaction was not a sale or
exchange for an annuity but instead a
transfer with a reserved life estate for
purposes of section 677, focusing on the
facts that:
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a. The creation of the trust and the
sale were part of the same
prearranged plan;
b. The trust was funded only with the
property transferred in exchange
for the annuity so the grantor
could look only to the transferred
property itself for her annuity
payments;
C. No effort was made to determine
the cost of a comparable
commercial annuity;
d. The actuarial value of the annuity
was less than the fair market
value of the transferred property;
and
e. The grantor treated herself as
beneficial owner of the property,
as evidenced by her direct receipt
of dividends on some of the
transferred stock for three years
after the trust was funded, and
her failure to assert penalties
when annuity payments were
.delayed.
ii. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the formal agreement between the
parties concerning the transfer of
property to the trust established the
grantor's status as a creditor of the
trust. It found that the fact that the
actuarial value of the annuity was less
than the fair market value of the
transferred property simply established
that there was a gift element to the
transaction.
a. It also argued that the stock
which paid dividends directly to
the decedent after the trust was
funded represented only a small
fraction of the trust property,
and that other transferred
property was properly treated as
belonging to the trust rather than
the grantor.
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b. The court distinguished Lazarus,
supra, because the annuity
payments in the present case were
not a mere "conduit" for the
income of the trust property, as
evidenced by the use of trust
principal, in some years, to make
annuity payments.
ii. In Becklenburg v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d
297 (7th Cir. 1959), the decedent
contributed 26.78% of the assets of a
trust in exchange for a $10,000 annuity.
The court held that the annuity payments
did not result in inclusion of the trust
property in the decedent's estate under
the predecessor to section 2036 because
the payments were not restricted to trust
income and were not limited to the
transferred property. The court focused,
in part, on the fact that the corpus of
the trust was in fact distributed to the
decedent.
iii. Similarly, in Cain v. Commissioner, 37
T.C. 185 (1961), the court respected the
characterization of a transfer of stock
to a corporation in exchange for an
annuity as a sale because: "It is clear
that the decedent divested herself of all
title to and control over the stock, and
[the transferee corporation], entered
into immediate and complete possession of
the property. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that the monthly installments
were chargeable to the transferred stock
or that the payments were in any way
related to the potential or expected
earnings of the . . . shares specifically
or to the profits of [the corporation],
generally. To the contrary, the
obligation was fixed and dependent solely
upon the singular obligation of [the
corporation]." 37 T.C. at 188.
iv. In Stern v. Commissioner, 747 F.2 555
(9th Cir. 1984), the appellate court
reversed a Tax Court opinion
recharacterizing transfers of stock to a
foreign trust in exchange for an annuity
as transfers with a retained life
interest. The court distinguished Bixby,
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supra, on the basis that the transferor
maintained no active management control
over the transferred property.
b. In conclusion, if the transferor sells
property to a trust previously funded with
substantial property in exchange for a note
having a value equal to the value of the
transferred property, the sale should not be
characterized as a transfer with a retained
life interest for purposes of sections 677 or
2036 so long as (i) the note is payable from
all property of the trust, rather than the
transferred property; (ii) the note is
payable from trust principal as well as trust
income; (iii) the transferor retains no
control over the trust property; and (iv) the
transferor enforces his rights, as a creditor
of the trust, to his payments under the note.
c. In addition, it would be helpful to structure
the transaction so that the transferor
receives a down payment and security for the
purchase price of the transferred assets, so
long as such security is not limited to the
transferred assets themselves.
E. Availability of Installment Method for Holding
Companies With HoldinQ Publicly Traded Securities.
1. An important exception to the availability of the
installment method may apply to family businesses
which serve as holding companies for publicly
traded securities.
a. Section 453(k) (2) (A) provides that use of the
installment method otherwise permitted by
section 453(a) is not allowed in the case of
an installment obligation arising out of the
sale of stock or securities which are traded
on an established securities market. The
statute provides that the IRS may provide for
the application of this subsection in whole
or in part for transactions in which the
rules of this subsection otherwise would be
avoided through the use of related parties,
pass-thru entities, or intermediaries.
b. No regulations have been promulgated pursuant
to this statutory authority. The legislative
history of section 453(k) states that the
regulations should apply to sales of a
-45-
taxpayer's interest in a wholly owned
corporation which owns publicly traded
securities. S.Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 133 (1986). On the other hand, the
legislative history provides that Congress
did not intend the regulations to deny the
use of the installment method where the
taxpayer cannot directly sell, or cause the
sale of, publicly traded stock or securities.
c. Therefore, if the taxpayer sells an interest
in a partnership or corporation holding
publicly traded stock to a grantor trust, the
ability to use the installment method upon a
subsequent sale triggered by termination of
grantor trust status or the transferor's
death will depend on the extent to which the
transferor could control or liquidate the
limited partnership.
i. The taxpayer's control or ability to
liquidate presumably could,
theoretically, be determined either at
the time of the initial transfer, or
at the time of the termination of the
grantor trust status, or the taxpayer's
death, as the case may be.
ii. Because under the principles of Rev. Rul.
85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184, no sale occurs
for federal income tax purposes at the
time of an initial transfer of property
by a grantor to a grantor trust, it is
likely that the grantor's control would
be measured for purposes of section
453(k) either at the time of the
termination of grantor trust status, or
the transferor's death, whichever occurs
first.
2. Apparently, however, the IRS will decline to apply
the "pass thru" rule of the flush language of
section 453(k) until regulations are issued. See
Tech. Ad. Mem. 9306001.
VI. LOAN TRANSACTIONS NOT INVOLVING SALES
A. Applicable Internal Revenue Code Provisions.
1. Section 163(d). An individual's interest
deduction for investment interest is limited to
the net investment income for the year.
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2. Section 163(h) (1). The personal interest of an
individual is nondeductible.
3. Section 163(h) (3). Qualified residence interest
is deductible.
4. Section 451(a). In the case of an individual
taxpayer on the cash method, interest income is
taxable in the year of receipt and not when
accrued.
5. Section 7872. Most gift loans (that is, those
with donative intent and having below-market
interest rates) are subject to rules that treat
the foregone interest as being transferred from
the lender to the borrower and retransferred by
the borrower to the lender on the last day of the
calendar year.
a. The interest imputation rules of section 7872
can be avoided by charging the applicable
federal rate ("AFR!') in the case of a demand
loan or in the case of a term loan by
charging sufficient interest so that the
present value of all payments due under the
loan equal or exceed the amount loaned.
Section 7872(e) (1).
b. For gift loans between individuals where the
aggregate amount outstanding does not exceed
$10,000, section 7872 does not apply as long
as the loan is not directly attributable to
the purchase or carrying of income-producing
assets. Section 7872(c) (2).
c. If an individual borrower's net investment
income for any year does not exceed $1,000
and the individual lender's loans to the
borrower do not exceed $100,000, there is no
imputation of income to the lender, but the
lender is deemed to have made a gift transfer
as to the foregone interest. If the
borrower's net investment income exceeds
$1,000, the amount treated as being
retransferred is limited to the borrower's
net investment income for the year. Section
7872(d) (1).
(1) This exception does not apply where one
of the principal purposes of the
interest arrangement is the avoidance of
any federal tax. Section 7872(d) (1) (B).
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(2) This exception also does not apply if
the borrower can control the timing of
the receipt of investment income and
actually does manipulate the timing to
accelerate or defer the receipt of
investment income (for example, with the
dividends of a closely held
corporation). Prop. Regs. § 1.7872-
8(c) (3).
(3) For taxable years beginning on or after
January 1, 1993, capital gains are
generally excluded from the calculation
of investment income. Section
163(d) (4) (B) ; section 13206(d) of The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993.
d. Husband and wife are treated as one person.
Section 7872 (f) (7).
(1) This applies to the husband and wife on
the lending side as well as the
borrowing side.
(2) It appears this may prevent a husband
and wife from electing split-gift
treatment under section 2513 for the
amounts deemed transferred under section
7872.
e. Generally, the section 7872(f) (8) exception
for loans subject to section 483 or section
1274 will apply to loans given in the sale or
exchange of property even if the rules of
section 483 or section 1274 do not apply by
reason of exceptions or safe harbor
provisions. Prop. Regs. § 1.7872-
2(a) (2) (ii).
f. For estate tax valuation purposes, the
applicable federal rate at death is used in
valuing a loan made with donative intent, and
no discount is allowed on the note for
uncollectibility unless the facts have
changed significantly since the time the loan
was made. Prop. Regs. § 20.7872-1.
B. Recent Cases and Rulings RelatinQ to Loan Transactions.
1. Flandreau v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1993). Loans to family members followed by
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contemporaneous loans back to the original lender
in identical amounts were not treated as bona fide
debts for purposes of section 2053.
2. Gatto v. Commissioner, 1 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1993).
No interest deduction was allowed under section
163 for interest paid by the grantor/borrower to a
trust/lender on loans made by the trust to the
grantor immediately upon receipt of the gift. The
court held that the grantor/borrower had done
nothing more than donate to the trust a promise to
make a gift of money in the future.
3. Rev. Rul. 86-17, 1986-1 C.B. 377. To simplify the
computation of foregone interest with respect to
below-market demand loans that are outstanding for
the entire calendar year, a blended annual rate is
published with the July applicable federal rates.
4. Private Letter Ruling 9418013. Applicable federal
rate ("AFR") loans to sons from QTIP marital trust
will not be deemed a distribution of all or part
of the surviving spouse's qualifying income
interest.
C. Examples of Uses of Loan Transactions.
1. Enhanced Annual Gift Program. Facts:
Grandparents with 12 grandchildren and 18 great
grandchildren are making $20,000 annual gifts and
paying tuition but want to do more to minimize
growth in their estates through appreciation and
accumulation of income. Solution: Under the
$10,000 de minimis rule, each grandparent loans
$5,000 interest free to each of these descendants,
for a total of $300,000.
2. Loan to Child for Business. Facts: Divorced
daughter needs capital to start a design business
with her son. The daughter has a roll-over IRA, a
home, alimony, and a few thousand dollars in
savings. The grandson has no assets of any
consequence. Solution: Father makes two $100,000
interest-free demand loans, one to his daughter
and one to the grandson. As long as neither has
net investment income in excess of $1,000 a year,
there is no imputation.
3. Loan to Child for House. Facts: Son needs
$750,000 for the downpayment on a new home. Son
is the remainderman of a charitable lead trust
that terminates in 1999. Solution: In September
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of 1993 father lends son $750,000, secured by a
second mortgage on the home, with interest only
payable at 5.25%- per quarter. The note matures on
December 31, 1999.
4. Loan to Avoid Taxable Gift. Facts: Mother has
used unified credit and wants to advance funds to
her daughter and son-in-law on a nongift basis to
allow them to support their lavish lifestyle
without being forced to dispose of their valuable
works of art. Solution: Mother loans $1,500,000
to daughter and son-in-law for a demand note
providing for interest at the lowest rate
necessary to avoid the imputation of interest
under any provision of the Internal Revenue Code.
The note provides that to the extent accrued
interest is not paid each December 31, it will be
compounded and added to principal.
5. Loan to Grantor Trust. Facts: Grandmother is the
grantor of an intentionally structured grantor
trust that owns insurance on her life for the
collective benefit of her grandchildren. She
prefers to fund the trust in some manner other
than through gifts that require the allocation of
part of her GST exemption. Solution: Grandmother
makes annual loans to the trust and charges
interest at the applicable federal rate. By being
treated as the owner of the trust for income tax
purposes, the interest she receives should be
nontaxable; and by charging a safe harbor interest
rate, there should be no element of a gift in the
transaction.
6. Use of Testamentary Charitable Remainder Trust.
Facts: Husband is the holder of a number of notes
from his children where the interest has been
compounding for years. Children own sufficient
insurance on his life to allow them to repay the
notes and all accrued and compounded interest at
his death. Husband wants to avoid having his
estate pay income taxes on all the accrued and
compounded interest. Solution: Husband creates a
charitable remainder trust under his will for the
benefit of his wife and directs his executor to
fund the trust with the note proceeds received
from the children in such a manner as the
interest, which is income in respect of a
decedent, will be passed out to the tax-exempt
charitable remainder trust.
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VII. PERSONAL GUARANTEES
A. Private Letter Ruling 9113009. Following the logic of
Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984), the IRS
has held in Private Letter Ruling 9113009 (subsequently
reversed as to the estate tax marital deduction
disallowance in Private Letter Ruling 9409018) that a
guarantee in favor of a family member results in a
present taxable gift.
1. The 1991 ruling does not advise how to value the
gift resulting from the guarantee itself. Query
whether the proper measure of the gift is what a
bonding company would charge.
2. The ruling also holds that an additional gift
would result if the guarantor is required to make
payment upon default.
3. The ruling approves the use of back-to-back loans
even though they are substantively the same as
loan guarantees. As long as the second loan has
adequate stated interest as required by section
7872, there is no gift and no imputation of
foregone points or finance charges.
B. Unanswered Questions. Assuming the guarantee is a
gift, there are many unanswered questions.
1. Is the gift a future interest or a present
interest gift?
2. To what extent is the value of the gift influenced
by the net worth of the borrower?
3. If the guarantee is with respect to a loan to a
corporation in which the guarantor is a minority
shareholder, is there a gift? What if the other
shareholders also guarantee the loan, but their
net worth is not substantial?
4. If the guarantor is the controlling shareholder of
a corporation whose loan he guarantees, is there a
gift to the minority shareholders? If so, does a
minority interest discount apply to the gift
guarantee?
5. How does the practitioner handle the gift tax
reporting requirements? Potential penalties?
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6. Can multiple gifts result from the same guarantee
(for example, where the loan guarantee is
extended)?
VIII. IRA/QTIP ARRANGEMENTS
A. The Problem.
1. Estate planning for IRAs initially appeared to
require some unhappy choices between income tax
planning and estate disposition objectives.
a. In order to achieve maximum income tax
deferral, an account owner was seemingly
required to name his or her spouse as the
beneficiary of any death benefits payable
from the account.
i. The account owner was then able to elect
distributions over the longest possible
time frame, which was either a fixed term
of years equal to the combined life
expectancies of the account owner and his
or her spouse, or their life expectancies
as recomputed annually. Sections
408(a) (6), 401(a) (9).
ii. The applicable life expectancies are
determined using the expected return
multiples in Regulations section 1.72-9,
Table VI.
b. In order to assure an estate tax deduction
for the value of the account at death, it
appeared necessary to give the surviving
spouse an unlimited power of withdrawal from
the account.
i. This unlimited power of withdrawal
satisfies the dual marital deduction
requirements that all income be
distributable currently to the spouse and
that the spouse have a general power of
appointment. Regs. §§ 20.2056(b)-
5(f) (a), 20.2056(b)-5(g) (1) and (5).
2. Designating the spouse as the beneficiary and
granting the spouse an unlimited power of
withdrawal obviously placed the spouse in control
of the ultimate disposition of the IRA
arrangement.
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3. However, the issuance of proposed regulations
governing distributions from IRA accounts and a
published revenue ruling dealing with IRAs, and
the marital deduction disclose an alternative for
account owners who wish to postpone distributions
for income tax reasons but retain control over the
ultimate disposition of the account principal.
Rev. Rul. 89-89, 1989-2 C.B. 231; See generally,
Lanier, "Qtipping IRAs" 4 Probate & Property 35
(March/April 1990).
a. The alternative is to name a QTIP trust as
the beneficiary of the IRA account.
b. This technique requires careful attention to
the technical requirements of the minimum
distribution regulations for IRAs and the
marital deduction rules relating to qualified
terminable interest property.
c. Care must be taken in drafting the necessary
beneficiary designation for the IRA document
and the QTIP marital trust agreement.
d. In some cases, appropriate amendments must be
incorporated into the governing instrument
for the IRA arrangement.
B. Minimum Distribution Recruirements.
1. The proposed regulations interpreting the minimum
distribution requirements of section 401(a) (9),
which were published in 1987, clarify that a trust
may be the designated beneficiary of qualified
plans and IRAs if certain conditions, set out in
the proposed regulations are met. Prop. Regs.
§ 1.401(a) (9)-1, Q&A D-5 and D-2.
a. The trust must be a valid irrevocable trust
under state law (or a trust which would be
valid if it had a corpus). It is unclear
whether a testamentary trust can meet this
requirement, and it is safer to name an inter
vivos trust as the beneficiary.
b. The beneficiaries of the trust must be
identifiable or, if the beneficiaries are
members of a class capable of expanding or
contracting, it must be possible to identify
the beneficiary with the shortest life
expectancy.
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c. A copy of the trust instrument must be
provided to the plan. Presumably this
requirement may be satisfied in the case of
an IRA by giving copies of the trust
instrument both to the custodian or trustee
of the account and to the account owner.
2. The foregoing requirements must be satisfied as of
the later of the time the trust is designated as
the beneficiary or the required beginning date for
distributions under the regulations, which is
generally April 1 of the year after the account
owner reaches age 70 1/2.
3. If more than one person has an interest in a trust
which is named as the beneficiary of an IRA, the
person whose life expectancy is shortest will be
used in calculating the minimum distributions
payable from the account. Prop. Regs.
§ 1.401(a) (9)-i, Q&A D-6.
a. For a typical QTIP trust, providing benefits
for the spouse for life and then to younger
generation beneficiaries, the spouse's life
expectancy generally will be shorter than the
life expectancies of any of the potential
remainder beneficiaries.
b. A distribution method based on the spouse's
life expectancy may therefore be selected in
these cases.
C. OTIP Recuirements.
1. Rev. Rul. 89-89, 1989-2 C.B. 231, provides that a
QTIP election can be made with respect to an IRA
of which the beneficiary is a trust.
a. The account owner described in this ruling
selected a distribution option requiring the
payment of all income from the undistributed
portion of the IRA by the close of each
calendar year and also requiring the
distribution of the corpus of the IRA in
equal annual installments over the life
expectancy of the spouse.
b. The provisions of the trust and state law
required that all income from the trust be
payable currently to the spouse, including
both the income distributed to the trust from
the IRA and income earned on the corpus of
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the marital trust. The installment payments
of corpus from the IRA were treated as corpus
by the recipient trust and accumulated.
c. No person had the power to appoint trust
principal to anyone other than the spouse.
2. In ruling that a QTIP election could be made with
respect to the IRA, the IRS observed that the
trust was a "mere conduit" for payment of the IRA
income to the spouse and concluded that the spouse
had a qualifying income interest as required by
section 2056(b) (7) (B) even though the IRA income
was payable in the first instance to the trust
rather than directly to the spouse.
a. Private Letter Ruling 9204017 holds that an
individual retirement annuity qualified for
the marital deduction under the special
annuity rules of section 2056(b) (7) (C), even
though payable to a QTIP trust, where the
terms of the trust required the
redistribution of the annuity payments within
the calendar year of receipt.
b. The trust also provided that no taxes or
trust expenses, including trustee's fees,
were to be allocated to those payments.
D. DraftinQ Considerations.
1. Using the above authorities to justify the
designation of a QTIP trust as the beneficiary of
an IRA requires drafting appropriate provisions in
the beneficiary designation instrument for the IRA
account, the QTIP trust itself and, sometimes, the
governing instrument of the IRA.
2. The beneficiary designation form should name a
trust satisfying the requirements of the proposed
regulations previously outlined.
a. The trust should be a valid trust under state
law (presumably an inter vivos trust).
b. The trust should also have as beneficiaries
the spouse and others who are either named or
ascertainable, with the spouse being the
beneficiary whose life expectancy is the
shortest.
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3. Assuming the spouse is the beneficiary with the
shortest life expectancy, the spouse's life
expectancy may be used in making a distribution
election, in accordance with the minimum
distribution requirements of section 401(a) (9) and
regulations thereunder, to distribute the account
over a fixed period either within the combined
life expectancies of the account owner and the
spouse or over the life expectancies of the owner
and spouse as recomputed annually.
4. Since installment methods of distribution do not
automatically require the distribution of all
income, the instrument should further require the
distribution of an amount equal to all of the
income of the IRA in any year in which the income
is greater than the installment distribution
otherwise payable.
a. The importance of satisfying the all income
requirement is underscored by the position
taken by the IRS in Technical Advice
Memorandum 9220007, involving an IRA naming
as beneficiary a QTIP trust.
b. The IRA plan document contemplated, and the
account owner apparently elected, a form of
installment distribution, but no attempt was
made during the owner's lifetime to require
the distribution of all income from the IRA
to the marital trust following his death.
c. Since the installment distribution method did
not ensure the distribution of all income on
a current basis from the IRA, the IRS held
that the spouse was not entitled to receive a
qualifying income interest for life as
required of QTIP arrangements by section
2057(b) (7) (B) (ii).
d. The attempt by the trustees of the QTIP trust
to cure the problem by electing to take
additional distributions equal to the amount
of the income of the IRA was ineffective,
according to the IRS, because the resulting
income interest did not "pass from the
decedent" as required by section
2056(b) (7) (B) (i).
e. The provisions of the marital trust giving
the spouse the right to require that all
trust property be made productive of income
-56-
also did not cure the income entitlement
problem. The IRS concluded that the IRA was
not an asset of the QTIP trust.
f. In contrast, Private Letter Ruling 9052015
held that an IRA qualified for QTIP treatment
where the account was payable in installments
over the spouse's life expectancy. This
holding should not be relied upon, however.
The favorable conclusion in the ruling was
seemingly based on representations that the
installment payments would always be greater
than the "projected" trust income.
5. The QTIP trust should, consistent with Rev. Rul.
89-89, supra, contain the following provisions:
a. The trust should require that all income
received from the IRA be redistributed by the
trustee to the spouse in the year of receipt.
b. In light of the importance of the "mere
conduit" analysis in Rev. Rul. 89-89, and the
stated facts in Private Letter Ruling 9204017
that taxes and trust expenses were not to be
charged to the annuities passed through the
trust, the trust should provide that all
taxes, fees, and expenses otherwise
chargeable against income received from the
IRA must be charged instead to trust
principal.
c. The trust should also require the trustee to
exercise discretionary powers as beneficiary
of the IRA so as to insure that all income of
the IRA will be paid on a current basis to
the trust, if the election of the account
owner to that effect is not fully binding on
all parties.
i. The binding effect on the beneficiary of
a distribution election made by the
deceased account owner is questionable
under the terms of many IRA governing
instruments.
ii. A trust provision requiring the trustee
to exercise powers so as to insure the
current distribution of all income would
seem to be a prudent precaution. See
Priv. Letter Rul. 9229017, approving an
IRA for QTIP treatment where both the IRA
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distribution election and the terms of
the trust required the current
distribution of all income in a
consistent manner. See also, Priv.
Letter Rul. 9043054 for a similar result.
6. Consideration should also be given to whether the
governing instrument of the IRA is consistent with
the beneficiary designation and distribution
provisions outlined above.
a. Many IRA governing instruments do not
contemplate that a trust may be named a
beneficiary of the account and do not,
therefore, contemplate that the person whose
life expectancy is used in calculating
distributions may differ from the person who
actually receives the distributions and
exercises beneficial powers.
b. Consideration should be given in such cases
to amending the governing instrument.
i. Such an amendment may cause the governing
instrument to lose the benefit of
existing IRS determinations as to the
qualified status of the IRA.
ii. Many financial institutions serving as
custodian or trustee of IRAs obtain group
determination letters covering all
accounts created under their master or
prototype plans. Modification of the
terms governing the accounts may cause
these rulings to cease to apply.
c. The account document should also be reviewed
to verify that it permits distributions
consistent with the approach recommended
above. One of the problems with the IRA
considered in Technical Advice Memorandum
9220007, discussed above, may have been that
it did not clearly permit payments of income
in excess of the amounts resulting from an
installment distribution election.
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IX. FINAL QTIP REGULATIONS
A. The Proposed OTIP Regulations.
1. The IRS issued the proposed regulations under
sections 2044, 2056, 2207A, 2519, 2523, and 6019
of the Internal Revenue Code on May 21, 1984.
2. Following the issuance of the proposed
regulations, the IRS received numerous comments
from various groups and individuals and there were
several changes to the law dealing with the
federal estate tax marital deduction.
B. The Final OTIP Regulations.
1. The IRS issued the final regulations on March 1,
1994, nearly 10 years after the issuance of the
proposed regulations and more than 12 years after
the enactment of section 2056(b) (7).
2. The final regulations reflect written comments
received by the IRS and changes to the law made
by:
a. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984;
b. The Tax Reform Act of 1986;
c. The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act
of 1988;
d. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989;
e. The Revenue and Reconciliation Act of 1990;
and
f. The Energy Policy Act of 1992.
C. Summary of Chancres.
1. The final regulations make the following changes
or additions to the original proposed regulations:
a. Availability of installment payment of estate
taxes under section 6166;
b. Guidance on evidence required to rebut the
presumption that the first deceased spouse's
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estate or the donor spouse claimed a marital
deduction;
c. Changes dealing with the term "specific
portion;"
d. Clarification as to who is responsible for
making the QTIP election with respect to
property not in the executor's possession;
e. Availability of a protective QTIP election
under limited circumstances;
f. Continuation of the position that an income
interest does not qualify as a qualifying
income interest if the income interest is
contingent on the executor's election of QTIP
treatment;
g. Elimination of the example allowing QTIP
treatment for an annuity purchased by an
executor pursuant to the decedent's
direction;
h. Clarification concerning the treatment of
annuities;
i. Clarification concerning the division into
separate trusts of a single marital trust
over which a partial QTIP election was made;
j. Addition of provisions dealing with "stub"
income;
k. Clarification as to when a charitable
remainder trust may qualify for the QTIP
election;
1. Reflection of the addition of section
2056(b) (9) and 2523(h) which deny a double
deduction for the same property for the same
decedent;
m. Elimination of the transitional rules for
computing the amount of the allowable estate
tax marital deduction for decedents dying
from 1977 to 1981;
n. Changes to the rules concerning the "net
gift" treatment of a disposition of a
qualifying income interest in property
subject to a QTIP election;
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o. Revisions of the examples dealing with the
transfer of a portion of an income interest
in a trust subject to a partial election to
reflect the application of section 2702;
p. Revisions concerning the timing of a QTIP
election on a gift tax return;
q. Addition of examples dealing with an inter
vivos QTIP where the donor retains a
secondary income interest; and
r. Revisions dealing with the marital deduction
and a noncitizen spouse.
2. In addition, the IRS has requested comments in the
following areas:
a. The application of the Energy Policy Act of
1992 to the treatment of certain annuities;
and
b. Whether the unitrust or annuity interest in a
charitable remainder trust qualifies as a
qualifying income interest for life in view
of the amendments made by the Energy Policy
Act of 1992.
D. Applicability of Section 6166.
1. The proposed regulations did not mention whether
the installment payment of estate taxes under
section 6166 would be available for business
interests included in the surviving spouse's
estate under section 2044.
2. The final regulations include a reference to
section 6166 to clarify that property included in
the surviving spouse's gross estate under section
2044 is treated as passing from the surviving
spouse upon the surviving spouse's later death for
purposes of determining whether the surviving
spouse's estate is eligible to pay the estate tax
liability in installments under section 6166.
E. Evidence Required to Rebut Presumption of OTIP
Election.
1. The final regulations include guidance to
taxpayers on the evidence that is required to
rebut the presumption that property in which the
surviving spouse had a qualifying income interest
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for life was deducted by the first deceased
spouse's estate under section 2056(b) (7) or by the
donor spouse under section 2523(f) in determining
the estate or gift tax liability.
2. Under the final regulations, if a marital
deduction is taken on either the estate or gift
tax return with respect to the transfer which
created the qualifying income interest, it is
presumed that the deduction was allowed for
purposes of section 2044. To avoid the inclusion
of property in the surviving spouse's estate, the
executor of the surviving spouse's estate must
establish that the deduction was not taken for the
transfer that created the qualifying income
interest.
3. One example given in the final regulations of
evidence rebutting the presumption is the executor
producing a copy of the estate or gift tax return
filed with respect to the transfer by the first
spouse or the first spouse's estate establishing
that no deduction was taken under section 2523(f)
or section 2056(b) (7). Another example cited is
the executor establishing that no return was filed
because the value of the estate was below the
threshold requirement for filing.
F. Specific Portion.
1. Several changes were made regarding the definition
of the term "specific portion" as used in sections
2056(b) (5), 2056(b) (7), 2523(e), and 2523(f).
2. In general, a spousal interest qualifies for the
marital deduction under section 2056(b) (5) or
section 2523(e) if the spouse receives an income
interest with respect to the entire interest in
property or a "specific portion" of the entire
interest, coupled with a general power of
appointment over the entire corpus or a specific
portion of the entire corpus.
3. Similarly, an interest is eligible for the
qualified terminable interest property election
under section 2056(b) (7) or section 2523(f) if the
spouse receives an income interest in the entire
interest or a specific portion of the interest.
4. In Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank and
Trust Company v. United States, 387 U.S. 213
(1967), the Supreme Court held that for purposes
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of section 2056(b) (5) a right to receive a
specified periodic payment ($24,000 per year) from
a trust also constitutes a right to receive the
income from a specific portion of the trust corpus
(that is, the pecuniary amount of corpus based
upon the assumed rate of return used in the
regulations that would generate the periodic
payment). In reaching this conclusion, the Court
invalidated Regulations section 20.2056(b)-5(c) to
the extent it precluded characterization of the
specific periodic payment as a right to income
from a specific portion of trust corpus.
5. In Estate of Alexander v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 34
(1984), which was affirmed without opinion by the
4th Circuit, the Tax Court held that a power of
appointment over a pecuniary amount of trust
.corpus constituted a power of appointment over a
"specific portion" of the trust property, thus
qualifying the property for the marital deduction
under section 2056(b) (5).
6. The proposed regulations provide a definition of
the term "specific portion" that conforms to the
Supreme Court's decision in Northeastern
Pennsylvania National Bank.
7. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 amended section
2056(b) and section 2523(e) and (f) to limit the
term "specific portion" to refer to a portion
determined only on a fractional or percentage
basis. These amendments are generally effective
in the case of estates of decedents dying after
October 24, 1992 (the date of enactment of the
Energy Policy Act of 1992) and to gifts made after
that date, subject to certain transitional rules.
8. The final regulations adopt the definition in the
proposed regulations of "specific portion" as a
fractional or percentage interest. Under the
final regulations, a partial interest in property
is treated as a specific portion of the entire
interest if the rights of the surviving spouse in
income and the spouse's general power of
appointment constitute a fractional or percentage
share of the entire property interest. The
surviving spouse's interest must reflect its
proportionate share of the increase or decrease in
the value of the entire property interest to which
the spouse's income rights and the general power
of appointment relate.
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9. This rule applies to decedents dying after October
24, 1992 if property passes to the spouse pursuant
to a will executed before October 24, 1992 and
either the spouse was under a mental disability to
change the disposition or the spouse dies before
October 24, 1995. Accordingly, an estate plan
with an Alexander-type of marital disposition must
be amended before October 25, 1995.
10. The IRS has requested comments on the application
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to the treatment
of annuities as described in the last sentence of
section 2056(b) (7) (B) (ii).
G. Definition of an Executor.
1. Regulations section 20.2056(b)-7(b) (3) has been
revised to clarify that an executor who is
appointed, qualified, and acting within the United
States within the meaning of section 2203 is
responsible for making the QTIP election, even
with respect to property not in the executor's
possession.
2. If there is no executor appointed, the person in
actual or constructive possession of the
qualifying income interest property may make the
election.
3. If there is no executor acting within the United
States, the person in actual or constructive
possession may also make the election with respect
to other property not in the actual or
constructive possession of that person. For
example, if there is no executor acting, the
trustee of an inter vivos trust that is included'
in the gross estate of the decedent may make the
election for property not only in the trust but
also outside the trust (notwithstanding that the
property is not in the trustee's possession).
H. Protective OTIP Election.
1. Paragraph (c) of Regulations section 20.2056(b)-7
provides limited circumstances under which a
protective QTIP election is recognized for estate
tax purposes.
2. The protective election will be recognized only if
at the time the estate tax return is filed a bona
fide issue is presented the resolution of which is
uncertain at the time the federal estate tax
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return is filed, that concerns whether an asset is
includible in the decedent's gross estate, or the
amount or nature of the property the surviving
spouse is entitled to receive.
3. Because of changes made to Schedule M of Form 706,
the IRS considered it unnecessary to provide for a
protective election for a trust that fails to meet
the requirements of section 2056(b) (5).
4. Once made, the protective election is irrevocable
and cannot be revoked. If a protective election
is made on the basis that a bona fide question
exists regarding the inclusion of an asset in the
gross estate and it is later determined that the
asset is includible, the protective election
becomes effective with respect to the asset and
cannot thereafter be revoked.
5. There is no provision for a protective gift tax
QTIP election. The IRS considered a protective
gift tax QTIP election but rejected it because of
the perceived absence of a need for such an
election.
I. Income Interest Contingent on OTIP Election.
1. The final regulations continue the position that
an income interest does not qualify as a
qualifying income interest if the income interest
is contingent on the executor's election of QTIP
treatment.
2. The Eighth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have
reversed the Tax Court on this issue. Estate of
Robertson v. Comm'r, 15 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1994)
reversing 98 T.C. 678 (1992); Estate of Clayton v.
Comm'r, 976 F.2d 1986 (5th Cir. 1992), reversing
97 T.C. 327 (1991).
3. In Estate of Robertson and Estate of Clayton, the
appellate courts found that under section
2056(b) (7) (B), qualified terminable interest
property is defined as property for which an
election is made. Thus, qualification of property
for QTIP treatment is always contingent on the
executor's election.
4. The IRS continues to assert that if the
substantive rights and interests the spouse
receives in trust property are dependent upon the
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executor's post-death exercise of discretionary
authority, the rights and interest received by the
spouse cannot properly be characterized as
qualifying as of the time of death, nor can the
rights and interest received by the spouse be
characterized as passing from the decedent to the
spouse, as required under section 2056(a).
5. The IRS believes that the appellate court's
position is inconsistent with the fundamental
principle that qualification of an interest in
property for the marital deduction is determined
as of the date of death.
J. No Marital Deduction for Direction to Purchase
Commercial Annuity.
1. The proposed regulations had an example where an
executor pursuant to a decedent's direction
purchased a commercial annuity that qualified for
the QTIP election. The final regulations did not
adopt this example.
2. According to the IRS, the example is in conflict
with section 2056(b) (1) (C) that provides that a
marital deduction is not allowed with respect to
any terminable interest if the interest is to be
acquired by the executor for the surviving spouse
pursuant to the direction of the decedent.
K. Division into Separate Trusts after Partial OTIP
Election.
1. Regulations section 20.2056(b)-7(b) provides that
a marital trust that qualified for QTIP treatment
may be divided into separate trusts to reflect a
partial election with respect to the trust if
authorized by the governing instrument or local
law.
2. This provision has been clarified to provide that
the severance of the trust must occur no later
than the termination of the period of estate
administration.
3. If, at the time of the filing of the estate tax
return, the trust has not yet been divided, the
intent to divide the trust must be unequivocally
signified on the estate tax return.
4. The provision has been further clarified to
indicate that, although the severed trust must be
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funded based on fair market values as of the date
of division, the trust need not be funded with a
pro rata portion of each asset.
L. Treatment of "Stub" Income.
1. The final regulations make it clear that the
income accruing between the last date income was
distributed to the surviving spouse and the date
of the surviving spouse's death is not required to
be distributed to the surviving spouse or to the
surviving spouse's estate.
2. This stub income is included in the estate of the
surviving spouse under section 2044.
3. Until Congress codifies the handling of stub
income, draftsmen should continue to provide for
stub income to go to the surviving spouse's estate
in view of Shelfer v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. No. 2
(1994), which held that QTIP treatment was not
proper where the stub income went to the
remainderman.
M. Treatment of Annuities.
1. Section 1941 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992
amended section 2056(b) to add subparagraph (10)
to define the term "specific portion" to only
include a portion determined on a fractional or
percentage basis. This provision was effective
for decedents dying on or before October 24, 1992.
2. For estates of decedents dying on or before
October 24, 1992, a surviving spouse's lifetime
annuity payable from a trust or other assets is
treated as a qualifying income interest.
3. There is a transitional rule for property passing
pursuant to a will or revocable trust executed on
or before October 24, 1992 for decedents dying
before October 24, 1995.
4. The 1992 amendment to section 2056(b) (7) (B) (ii)
stated that an annuity shall be treated in a
manner similar to an income interest in property
to the extent provided in regulations. The IRS
has invited comments on the application of this
provision to the treatment of annuities.
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N. Charitable Remainder Trusts.
1. Regulations section 20.2056(b)-8 has been revised
to provide that a charitable remainder trust may
qualify for the marital deduction under section
2056(b) (7) in situations where the surviving
spouse is the only noncharitable beneficiary of
the charitable remainder trust.
2. If the surviving spouse is the only noncharitable
beneficiary of a charitable remainder annuity or
unitrust, section 2056(b) (1) does not apply to the
interest in the trust. Accordingly, the value of
the interest passing to the spouse qualifies for a
marital deduction under section 2056(b) (8) and the
value of the remainder interest qualifies for a
charitable deduction under section 2055. No QTIP
election may be made with respect to this
property. (No election is necessary in any
event.)
3. If the surviving spouse is not the only non-
charitable beneficiary, the trust may come within
the annuity transitional rules and the spousal
annuity or unitrust may qualify under Regulations
section 20.2056(b)-(7) (e) as a qualifying income
interest. If the decedent dies after October 24,
1992, and the surviving spouse is not the only
noncharitable beneficiary of a charitable
remainder trust, the question is whether future
regulations will treat the annuity in a manner
similar to an income interest in property (the
amendment made by the Energy Policy Act of 1992).
0. Right of Recovery of Estate Taxes in the Case of OTIP
Property.
1. If the gross estate includes QTIP property by
reason of section 2044 (the surviving spouse has
died and the QTIP property is includible in the
surviving spouse's estate), the estate of the
surviving spouse is entitled to recover from the
person receiving the property the amount of
federal estate tax attributable to that property.
2. Failure of an estate to exercise a right of
recovery is treated as a transfer for federal gift
tax purposes of the unrecovered amounts from the
persons who would benefit from the recovery to the
persons from whom the recovery could have been
obtained. A delay in the exercise of the right of
recovery may be treated as an interest-free loan
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with appropriate gift tax consequences under
section 7872.
3. These provisions do not apply to the extent that
the surviving spouse's will provides that a
recovery shall not be made or to the extent that
the beneficiaries cannot otherwise compel
recovery. If the surviving spouse gives the
executor discretion to waive the right of recovery
and the executor waives the right, no gift occurs.
P. Disposition of Income Interest.
1. The proposed QTIP regulations treated the section
2519 gift of an income interest as a net gift. If
the surviving spouse transferred all or part of
the spouse's income interest in QTIP property, the
spouse was making a gift under section 2519.
Under section 2207A(b) a spouse has the right to
recover from the persons receiving the transferred
property any gift tax imposed on the transfer. In
determining the amount of the gift under section
2519, the value of the transfer is reduced by the
amount of the gift tax reimbursement.
2. The final regulations delete the reference in
Regulations section 25.2519-1(c) treating the
transfer as a net gift. The IRS anticipates that
the issue regarding net gift treatment will be the
subject of subsequent proposed regulations and
requests comments on this issue.
Q. Gift Tax OTIP Election.
1. The final regulations reflect the changes made to
section 2523(f) (4) (A) by the Tax Reform Act of
1986 that allow the gift tax QTIP election to be
made on or before the date prescribed for filing a
gift tax return, including extensions.
2. This reflects the cure of the problem of extending
income and gift tax returns and not being able to
make a QTIP election.
R. Denial of Double Deduction.
1. The final regulations make it clear that the value
of an interest in property may not be deducted for
federal estate tax purposes more than once with
respect to the same decedent.
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2. Where the decedent transfers a life estate in a
farm to the surviving spouse with a remainder to
charity, the entire property is treated as passing
to the spouse if a QTIP election is made. No part
of the value of the property will qualify for a
charitable deduction under section 2055.
S. Changes Made Because of Chapter 14.
1. Two examples that were in the proposed regulations
were changed to reflect the enactment of Chapter
14.
2. Examples 4 and 5 under Regulations section
25.2519-1(g) were revised to include a reference
to section 2702. In those examples, the surviving
spouse makes a gift of 40% of the surviving spouse
interest in a QTIP trust where a partial QTIP
election had been made. The final regulations
referred to section 2702 and states that the
surviving spouse's retained income interest would
be valued at zero under that section, thereby
increasing the section 2519 gift.
T. Changes to Inter Vivos OTIP Requlations.
1. The final regulations made several changes to the
proposed regulations under section 2523.
2. The final regulations make it clear that no
marital deduction is allowed with respect to a
gift for transfers to a spouse who is not a
citizen of the United States at the time of the
transfer.
3. Example 9 to Regulations section 25.2523(f) makes
it clear that a QTIP election may not be made for
an income interest following the donor's income
interest.
4. Example 10 to Regulations section 25.2523(f) makes
it clear that the donor may reserve an income
interest following an income interest given to the
donor's spouse. The income interest given to the
donor's spouse will qualify for QTIP treatment
under section 2523(f). Under the facts of Example
10, the donor died before the spouse and no
portion of the trust corpus was includible in the
donor's gross estate because of the donor's
retained interest in the trust.
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U. Rejected Comments.
1. The IRS rejected the comment suggesting that an
inter vivos transfer in trust where the donor
retains an income interest and the spouse receives
the right to trust income on termination of the
donor's preceding life income interest should
qualify for QTIP treatment under section 2523(f).
2. The IRS still refuses to allow the surviving
spouse to have a lifetime power of appointment
over QTIP property.
X. CHARITABLE LEAD TRUSTS
A. General Description of a Charitable Lead Trust.
1. A charitable lead trust is the reverse of a
charitable remainder trust. With a charitable
lead trust, the charitable interest precedes or
"leads" the remainder interest which generally
passes to the donor's descendants.
2. A charitable lead trust offers a way to benefit
charity while keeping the capital in the family
without the need for "wealth replacement"
techniques.
3. The qualifying charitable lead interest may either
be in the form of an annuity interest or a
unitrust interest and may be created during
lifetime or at death.
4. Although qualified charitable lead trusts are not
as strictly regulated as charitable remainder
trusts, many sections of the Internal Revenue Code
must be considered.
B. Primary Uses of Charitable Lead Trusts.
1. Because all types of split-interest charitable
trusts result in a shifting of a part of a
family's income or wealth to charity, charitable
lead trusts are best suited for families that have
a true desire to benefit charity.
2. Leverage for transfer tax purposes is available
through a gift or estate tax charitable deduction
for the annuity or unitrust interest.
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charitable lead trust with an asset such as a
limited partnership interest that has a good cash
flow but can be discounted for transfer tax
purposes.
C. Type of Charitable Lead Trusts.
1. Charitable lead annuity trust -- A fixed dollar
amount or fixed percentage of the initial net fair
market value is payable to one or more charitable
organizations for the term of the trust.
2. Charitable Lead Unitrust -- A fixed percentage of
the net fair market redetermined annually is
payable to one or more charitable organizations
for the term of the trust.
3. Nonqualifying or Common Law Lead Trust -- The
income or other interest payable to charity is in
a form other than a guaranteed annuity or unitrust
interest that is not a completed gift. If
structured to avoid section 2702 (for example,
gift of the remainder to a nonfamily member), the
remainder value may be smaller than with an
annuity or unitrust interest.
4. Inter Vivos vs. Testamentary -- The principal
difference is a carry over of basis when the trust
is created during lifetime.
5. Grantor vs. Nongrantor -- Grantor trust structure
is not common but can be used as a sophisticated
income tax planning tool and in estate planning
situations where intentional grantor trust
treatment is desired.
6. Term of Years vs. Life or Lives -- These can
generally be mixed and matched in any fashion
without the strictures that apply to charitable
remainder trusts.
D. Applicable Internal Revenue Code Sections.
1. Section 170(f) (2) (B). No income tax charitable
deduction is allowed for the charitable lead
interest unless it is in the form of a guaranteed
annuity or unitrust interest and the grantor is
treated as the owner of such interest for purposes
of section 671.
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2. Section 642(c). The charitable lead trust is
allowed an unlimited income tax charitable
deduction for amounts of gross income paid to
charity.
3. Section 644. If a trust sells an appreciated
asset within two years of its transfer to the
trust, a special tax is payable by the trust equal
to the income tax the donor would have paid had
the donor sold the asset.
4. Section 2055(e) (2) (B). No estate tax charitable
deduction is allowed for the charitable lead
interest unless it is in the form of a guaranteed
annuity or unitrust interest.
5. Section 2522(c) (2) (B). No gift tax charitable
deduction is allowed for the charitable lead
interest unless it is in the form of a guaranteed
annuity or unitrust interest.
6. Section 2642(e). The inclusion ratio for a
charitable lead annuity trust is adjusted by
increasing the numerator by interest using the
same rate used to determine the charitable
deduction.
a. Consequently, in a charitable lead annuity
trust it may be best to delay allocating GST
exemption until the end of the lead interest.
Query whether an amended notice of allocation
is permissible to "recover" excess GST
exemption where the exemption is allocated at.
the outset and upon application of section
2642(e) there would be an over allocation.
b. In a charitable lead unitrust, the GST
exemption can be precisely allocated at the
outset when the trust is created, and
opportunities for leverage exist because the
amount of the allocation necessary to produce
a zero inclusion ratio is the calculated
value of the remainder for gift and estate
tax purposes.
7. Section 4947(a) (2). As a split-interest trust, a
charitable lead annuity or unitrust is subject to
the private foundation rules of sections 508(e)
and 4941 through 4945.
8. Section 4947(b) (3) (A). Sections 4943 and 4944
(excess business holdings and jeopardy
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investments) do not apply to a charitable lead
annuity or unitrust if all the income interest
(and none of the remainder interest) is payable to
charity and the charitable deduction amount is not
more than 60% of the value of the trust.
9. Section 7520. This section sets forth the special
rules to be used in valuing annuities, life
estates, and interests for a term of years.
a. Fluctuations in the section 7520 rate have
little effect on unitrust interests.
However, if the unitrust payout rate is lower
than the section 7520 rate, the unitrust will
produce a larger charitable deduction than an
annuity trust because the excess of the
assumed return over the payout rate is deemed
to cause an increase in the trust assets
against which the unitrust payout will be
calculated.
b. Low section 7520 rates increase the value of
a lead annuity interest (giving a greater
charitable deduction) and reduce the taxable
remainder.
c. High section 7520 rates decrease the value of
a lead annuity interest (giving a smaller
charitable deduction) and increasing the
taxable remainder.
d. Conversely, in a charitable remainder trust,
higher section 7520 rates produce a greater
charitable deduction through a larger
remainder value, and lower rates produce a
smaller charitable deduction.
E. Cases and Rulings RelatinQ to Lead Trusts.
1. Rebecca K. Crown Income Charitable Trust v.
Commissioner, 8 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1993). Amounts
in excess of the annuity specified in the trust
agreement are not deductible under section 642(c)
even though the amounts are not in commutation of
future amounts and may be within the overall
annuity obligation when considered in the
aggregate.
2. The Ann Jackson Family Foundation v. Commissioner,
15 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 1994). Distributions from a
charitable lead trust to a private foundation are
not includible in the distributable amount of the
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private foundation for purposes of the minimum
payout requirements of section 4942. Regulations
section 53.4942(a)-2 was found to be invalid and
inconsistent with the 1981 amendment to section
4942. Query whether the same logic might apply to
invalidate Regulations section 53.4940-1(d) (2)
concerning the character of distributions from a
lead trust to a private foundation for purposes of
the excise tax on net investment income.
3. Rifkind v. United States, 84-2 U.S.T.C. 13,577
(Cls. Ct. 1984). The decedent's ability to
participate as an officer and director of a
foundation in the selection of charitable
recipients of grants from the foundation, which
was funded with income from a charitable lead
trust created by the decedent, constituted a
section 2036(a) retained power to control the
enjoyment of the trust property and caused
inclusion of the trust in the gross estate.
a. A similar problem can arise where a trustee
is given a power (for example, selection of
the charities to receive the lead interest)
that, if held by the grantor, would have
caused inclusion in the gross estate. See
McCabe v. United States, 475 F.2d 1142 (Ct.
Cl. 1973), where there was clear evidence
that the trustee, in making supposedly
discretionary distributions, was acting under
the control of the transferor.
b. Refer to Private Letter Ruling 9331015 for
suggested provisions that can be used to
avoid section 2036(a) problems.
c. If the charitable lead trust is created by a
corporation, the charitable deduction should
not be jeopardized because its directors are
involved in selecting the charitable
recipients. See Private Letter Ruling
9350009 concerning the funding of a private
foundation by a corporation.
4. Boeshore v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 523 (1982). The
charitable lead unitrust interest may be preceded
in time by a private lead unitrust interest
without losing the deduction for the charitable
interest. The court found Regulations section
20.2055-2(e) (2) (vii) (e) to be invalid. But see
Action on Decision 1987-003 (June 15, 1987)
(acquiescence in result only) where the Internal
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Revenue Service states that it will continue to
apply the regulations in circumstances presenting
the potential for abuse or a risk the charity will
not receive its interest.
5. Rev. Rul. 72-552, 1972-2 C.B. 525. The value of
property transferred during lifetime to a
charitable organization is includible in the
decedent's gross estate under section 2036(a)
where the decedent was an officer and director of
the organization that had authorized the decedent
and another as officers to select the charitable
recipients.
6. Rev. Rul. 78-101, 1978-1 C.B. 301. The failure to
designate specific charitable recipients of a
charitable lead unitrust interest does not
disqualify the interest for a charitable deduction
where the trustee has the power to select the
recipients.
7. Rev. Rul. 83-75, 1983-1 C.B. 114. The
distribution by a trust of appreciated securities
in satisfaction of its obligation to pay a fixed
annuity to a charitable organization results in a
taxable gain to the trust. The trust is entitled
to a charitable deduction under section 642(c)
equal to the amount of gain recognized upon the
distribution.
8. Rev. Rul. 88-27, 1988-1 C.B. 331. A charitable
lead annuity interest does not qualify as a
guaranteed annuity interest where the trustee has
the discretion to commute and prepay the
charitable interest before the expiration of the
specified term of the trust. This result obtains
even where the instrument states that the rate of
commutation is equal to the rate used to compute
the original charitable gift tax deduction taken
by the grantor. Query whether paying the unpaid
annuity installments on an accelerated basis,
without a discount, is permissible.
9. Rev. Rul. 88-82, 1988-2 C.B. 336. No charitable
deduction is allowable for the lead interest where
any excess earnings are distributable to the
remaindermen. However, excess earnings may be
accumulated for future distribution to the
remaindermen without being subject to sections
4943 and 4944 if the lead interest does not
violate the 60% test.
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10. Rev. Proc. 83-32, 1983-1 C.B. 723. Charitable
lead trusts are required to file Forms 1041 and
5227, and where applicable, Forms 1041-A and 4720.
F. Examples of Uses of Lead Trusts.
1. Unified Credit Gift Through Segregation of Portion
of Portfolio. Facts: Widower with one child and
a modest estate consisting largely of a blue chip
portfolio wants to make provision for his church
and university and use a portion of his unified
credit to remove future growth from his gross
estate. Solution: Create a simple inter vivos
charitable lead annuity trust with high basis
common stocks and naming daughter as trustee. Pay
fixed amount annually to each charity for
grantor's life. Instruct broker to issue checks
once a year.
2. Leveracie of Unified Credit. Facts: Estate owner
wishes to make the most effective use of his
unified credit at death and does not mind making
his children wait to receive their inheritances.
Solution: Create a testamentary charitable lead
unitrust for a term of years and let the children
designate the charitable recipients.
3. Leverage of GST Exemption. Facts: In addition to
making the most effective use of his unified
credit, the estate owner wishes to maximize the
advantages of his GST exemption. Solution:
Create a testamentary charitable lead unitrust for
a term of years with the grandchildren as
remaindermen.
4. Reduction of Estates Taxes. Facts: Estate owner
wishes to reduce estate taxes and is willing to
have his children's receipt of their inheritances
deferred for an extended period. Solution:
Create a testamentary charitable lead unitrust for
a term of years commencing at the death of the
estate owner, or at the surviving spouse's death
in the case of a marital trust.
5. Source for Funding Donor Advised Fund. Facts:
Individual wishes to support a community
foundation by creating a donor advised fund for
his family. Solution: Create an inter vivos or
testamentary charitable lead annuity or unitrust
designated to provide the community foundation
with lead trust payments that in the aggregate
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will create an appropriately funded donor advised
fund.
6. Substitute for Private Foundation. Facts:
Husband and wife like the idea of a private
foundation as a vehicle for lifetime charitable
giving but do not want the capital to be lost by
the family. Solution: Create an inter vivos
charitable lead annuity or unitrust with one
spouse as grantor and the other as trustee. The
trustee spouse makes the lead payments to the
family's favorite charities periodically during
the year just as could be done through a private
foundation.
7. Source for FundinQ Private Foundation. Facts:
Family has existing private foundation, and
parents desire to enhance its endowment without
depriving the children of their ultimate
inheritances. Solution: Create an inter vivos
charitable lead annuity or unitrust for a
relatively short term with the family foundation
as the charitable recipient.
8. FundinQ Family Charitable Giving. Facts: Parents
and children annually give substantial amounts to
various charitable organizations and intend to
continue this pattern, and parents wish to make
taxable gifts to shift growth from their gross
estates but do not want to sacrifice their cash
flow and existing standard of living. Solution:
Create a long-term inter vivos charitable lead
unitrust with parents income-producing assets and
with children as trustees.
9. Widow's Gift of Marital Trust Assets. Facts:
Widow with independent wealth and ability to make
a lifetime withdrawal or appointment of the
marital trust created by her husband desires to
use his assets to establish an endowment in his
memory at his university while removing growth in
the assets from her gross estate. Solution:
Create an inter vivos charitable lead annuity or
unitrust with a payout rate and term to give the
university the necessary endowment amount.
10. Rate Arbitrage or Reduction of Large Unusual Gain.
Facts: Taxpayer anticipates being in a lower
bracket in future years and desires to use
charitable planning to reduce his taxes without
depriving his family of the underlying assets.
Solution: Create an inter vivos grantor
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charitable lead annuity or unitrust, with a payout
rate and term suitable to the grantor, and
structured as a grantor trust.
11. Art Collection. Facts: Widow with large art
collection desires to use the collection to
provide an endowment to her university and to
reduce her estate taxes. Solution: Create a
testamentary charitable lead annuity trust, with
the children as trustees, authorizing the trustees
to satisfy the annuity by distributing to the
university art objects in kind that can be sold by
the university to produce cash to fund the
endowment.
12. Closely Held Stock. Facts: Father wishes to
transfer future growth in family's C corporation
to his children while at the same time benefiting
the family's friendly charity. Solution: Create
an inter vivos charitable lead annuity trust that
will not be subject to section 4943, will be
funded with cash and stock, and will be authorized
to distribute stock in kind to the charity in
satisfaction of the annuity obligation, after
which the charity could offer the stock to the
corporation for redemption.
13. Double Discounts for Closely Held Stock. Facts:
Father wishes to give minority-interest stock in
the family's C or S corporation to his children
and is willing to postpone their receipt of the
shares and to allow the dividends to benefit
charity. Solution: Create an inter vivos
charitable lead annuity or unitrust (structured as
a grantor trust if S stock is involved) funded
with a certain amount of cash in addition to the
stock. For gift tax purposes there are double
discounts -- first, discounts for minority
interest and lack of marketability; and second,
for the value of the charitable lead annuity or
unitrust interest. The cash in the trust, as
augmented by dividends, can be used to pay the
charitable lead interest, and the stock at its
appreciated value will pass to the children upon
termination of the trust.
14. Tax-Exempt Bonds. Facts: Owner of tax-exempt
bonds wishes to use these bonds to obtain a
current income tax deduction. Solution: Create
an inter vivos charitable lead annuity or unitrust
structured as a grantor trust that will provide
the grantor with a current income tax deduction
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equal to the annuity or unitrust value and without
having taxable income to report in future years.
15. Corporate Lead Trust. Facts: Corporation has
"unwanted" appreciated assets that would generate
corporate level tax if sold or distributed to
shareholders. Solution: Create a charitable lead
annuity or unitrust for a term of years and
structure trust as a grantor trust if
circumstances warrant. Offers opportunities to
avoid the General Utilities tax and to shift
growth outside the corporation if the remainder
interest is assigned to the shareholders.
16. Leveraqe for Spouse's Poor Health. Facts:
Husband and wife wish to create charitable lead
trust as part of their gift program. Wife is
younger than husband and is in poor health but can
be expected to live for more than one year.
Solution: Create a charitable lead annuity or
unitrust to continue for the wife's life. A
larger charitable deduction will be available than
if based on husband's life, and the remainder will
likely become possessory at a much earlier time.
17. Leverage for Unrelated Person's Poor Health.
Facts: Estate owner wishes to create a charitable
lead trust with significant leverage. Solution:
Create an inter vivos charitable lead annuity or
unitrust for the life of a younger person with a
significantly reduced life expectancy (for
example, a person with AIDS) who can be expected
to live at least one year.
18. Avoiding Private Foundation Rules. Facts:
Childless business owner wishes to give stock in
family corporation to a charitable lead trust (for
the ultimate benefit of his nephew) that can,
without self-dealing, sell all or a portion of the
stock back to the company or to the grantor if the
nephew decides to leave the business. Solution:
Create a nonqualifying lead trust for the nephew,
avoiding section 2702. The trust will not be a
section 4947(a) (2) split-interest trust subject to
the section 4941 self-dealing rules on any sale of
the stock because no gift tax charitable deduction
is allowable.
19. Avoiding High State Income Taxes. Facts:
Individual lives in a state that has high state
income taxes and already has more charitable
deductions being carried forward than he can use.
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Solution: Create a charitable lead annuity or
unitrust as a nongrantor trust, thereby removing
the income from his returns, both federal and
state, and effectively getting a 100% deduction
and doing the tax authorities out of significant
dollars.
20. CascadinQ Lead Trusts. Facts: An investor with
many entrepreneurial investments, and who is
otherwise willing to have the investments go to
charity, wishes to use zeroed-out GRAT techniques
to produce a benefit without transfer tax for his
children if one or more of the investments have
outstanding growth. Solution: Create a series of
charitable lead annuity trusts having staggered or
"cascading" termination dates.
XI. SPLIT-DOLLAR LIFE INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS
A. Tax Considerations.
1. The general rules governing the tax treatment of
split-dollar arrangements are found in Rev. Rul.
64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11, and Rev. Rul. 66-110,
1966-1 C.B. 12, both of which predate section
7872. However, the IRS has continued to issue
favorable private letter rulings on both
collateral assignment and endorsement method
arrangements with both employees and shareholders.
See, for example, Private Letter Rulings 9037012
and 9318007.
2. In view of the liberal position of the Internal
Revenue Service in Technical Advice Memorandum
9323002, allowing the designated owner of the
policy to be changed by submission of a
supplementary application without triggering the
three-year rule of section 2035, considerable
flexibility is available to design trust ownership
arrangements while a split-dollar plan is being
implemented.
3. In the case of a controlling shareholder who
assigns his rights, it is imperative to structure
things as described in Situation 3 of Rev. Rul.
76-274, 1976-2 C.B. 278, in order to avoid
attribution of corporate incidents of ownership
and the result in Estate of Dimen v. Commissioner,
72 T.C. 198 (1979).
4. Rev. Rul. 78-420, 1978-2 C.B. 67, discusses the
income and gift tax consequences where the
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employee's spouse is the owner. The amount of the
gift because of the employer's premium payment is
the value of the insurance protection provided by
the employer (that is, the P.S. 58 cost or the
insurer's yearly term rate). Technical Advice
Memorandum 8206014 is an example of how not to
structure split-dollar insurance with the spouse
of an insured who was the 100% shareholder.
5. In "equity" split-dollar, there is no clear
authority that the build up will not be taxed to
the employee currently as an "other benefit" under
Rev. Rul. 66-110 or on a deferred basis at rollout
under section 83. However, most insurance
professionals install these leveraged arrangements
on the assumption, which is probably correct, that
all forms of split-dollar arrangements have been
sanctioned by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 66-110 and any
change in this position would be prospective only.
6. A rollout has the risk of being treated as a
transfer for value under section 101(a) (2) in an
endorsement method arrangement. Use of the
"undocumented" collateral assignment method can
minimize this potential problem.
7. If the equity build up is subject to income tax,
parallel gift tax treatment should follow under
the theory of Rev. Rul. 78-420.
8. In an S corporation shareholder split-dollar
agreement where each shareholder must reimburse
the corporation to the extent its payment confers
an economic benefit (that is, for example, the
P.S. 58 cost), the split-dollar agreement does not
create more than one class of stock within the
meaning of section 1361(b) (1) (D) because the
arrangement does not alter rights to distribution
and liquidation proceeds. See, for example,
Private Letter Ruling 9331009. A stronger
position probably exists where the insureds are
shareholder/employees (and not just shareholders)
as in Private Letter Ruling 9248019 which cites
Rev. Rul. 91-26, 1991-2 C.B. 185, dealing with the
payment of accident and health insurance premiums
on behalf of shareholder/employees.
B. Examples of Uses of Split-Dollar Insurance.
1. Benefits for Nonshareholder Children. Facts:
Father has four children, only two of whom are
shareholder/employees of the family business and
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economically advantaged. Father wants all four
children to receive a minimum amount of second-to-
die insurance benefits to help with liquidity
needed for death taxes and wants the two
nonshareholder children to receive additional
amounts in the nature of bequests at the death of
the survivor of father and mother. Solution:
Father causes corporation to enter into employer-
pay-all split-dollar agreements with all four
children providing joint coverage on father and
mother, but with the nonshareholder children
having substantially more coverage. Father
reports the P.S. 38 economic benefit on his W-2
and treats the same amount as part of his annual
exclusion gifts to the children.
2. Substitute for Other Benefits for Key Employee.
Facts: Key employee.of a family S corporation has
asked for stock options or other arrangements to
enhance the assets available to his family at his
death or retirement. Controlling shareholder is
willing to issue stock or grant stock options but
is not willing to commit the corporation to
mandatory buy-sell obligations. Solution: Key
employee creates an irrevocable Crummey trust with
his wife as trustee and life beneficiary to enter
into an employer-pay-all split-dollar agreement
with the corporation. Trust applies for and
becomes the owner of a variable life policy on the
key employee's life, corporation pays the
premiums, key employee reports the P.S. 58
economic benefit on his W-2, and key employee
treats the economic benefit amount as annual
exclusion gifts to the Crummey power holders.
3. Generation-Skipping Planning for Controlling
Shareholder/Employee. Facts: Chief executive officer
is the largest shareholder of a closely held
corporation that will likely go public in a few years.
Officer is concerned about his estate's lack of
liquidity and the limitations of Rule 144 and is
receptive to the leverage offered by split-dollar
concepts. Solution: Officer creates a generation-
skipping trust for his grandchildren and their
descendants to last for the perpetuities period. The
trust applies for and becomes the owner of second-to-
die insurance on the life of the officer and his wife.
The split-dollar agreement with the employer
corporation calls for the trust to contribute the P.S.
38 amount each year toward the premiums. The officer
will make gifts each year of the P.S. 38 amount to the
trust and will allocate a portion of his GST exemption
to the gifts.
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